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Abstract
At the heart of modern optimal tax research is the assumption that the objective of taxation is
Utilitarian. I present new survey evidence that most people disagree with this assumption, preferring
tax policies based at least in part on a classic alternative objective: the principle of Equal Sacri￿ce.
I generalize the standard model to accommodate this preference for a mixed objective, proposing a
method by which to make disparate criteria commensurable while respecting Pareto e¢ ciency. Then, I
show that optimal policy in this generalized model, calibrated to the survey evidence and U.S. microdata,
quantitatively matches several features of existing tax policy that are incompatible in the conventional
model but widely endorsed in reality, including the coexistence of substantial redistribution and limited
tagging. Together, these ￿ndings demonstrate the potential of a positive theory of optimal taxation.
￿277 Morgan Hall, Harvard Business School; mweinzierl@hbs.edu; and NBER. Portions of this paper incorporate and build
on material from Weinzierl (2012), which was entitled "Why do we Redistribute so Much but Tag so Little?" I am grateful to
Alan Auerbach, Felix Bierbrauer, Kim Clausing, Raj Chetty, Mihir Desai, Rafael di Tella, Amy Finkelstein, Victor Fleischer,
John Friedman, Alex Gelber, Mikhail Golosov, Caroline Hoxby, Bas Jacobs, Louis Kaplow, Wojciech Kopczuk, Camille Landais,
Benjamin B. Lockwood, Greg Mankiw, Yoram Margalioth, Joe Mazor, Jean-Baptiste Michaud, Je⁄ Miron, Dina Pomeranz,
Alex Raskolnikov, Meg Rithmire, Julio Rotemberg, Emmanuel Saez, Bernard Salanie, Florian Scheuer, Eytan Sheshinski, Ali
Shourideh, Stefanie Stantcheva, Alain Trannoy, Aleh Tsyvinski, David Weisbach, Glen Weyl, John Weymark, Danny Yagan,
and several anonymous referees for helpful discussions.
1Introduction
Modern tax theorists have a workhorse model. Created by Mirrlees (1971) more than four decades ago, that
model has been used to study countless aspects of tax policy. It provides the benchmark guidelines against
which policy proposals are often judged, and its recommendations form the basis of prominent policy advice.
To cite only one example, the recent authoritative summary of modern tax theory and its policy implications
was chaired by James Mirrlees and entitled The Mirrlees Review (2010).
At the heart of this standard model lies a strong assumption: the objective of tax policy is Utilitarian.
Mirrlees introduced this assumption with little explanation, but virtually all optimal tax research in the last
four decades has adopted it.1 To the extent that this assumption has been relaxed, it has usually been to
allow for a more redistributive normative criterion, such as the Rawlsian priority on the least advantaged.
Some theorists have taken a more agnostic approach by examining only whether policies are optimal given
some set of weights on individuals￿welfares; that is, Pareto e¢ cient. An open question in that approach
is what weights to use when choosing between a wide range of Pareto-e¢ cient policy options; in practice,
Utilitarian (or Rawlsian) weights are typically the default assumption.2 The relatively little attention paid to
the Utilitarian assumption and its alternatives, as opposed to its policy implications, is especially surprising
given that optimal tax theory is one of few forthrightly normative ￿elds in economic research.
The ￿rst contribution of this paper is to present evidence that most people appear to disagree with this
core assumption, at least in the United States. I design and implement a novel survey in which respondents
are asked to choose between sets of feasible and incentive compatible tax policies for a society with the
income distribution of the current United States. First, I ask them to choose between two policies: one
based on the standard Utilitarian criterion and the other based on the principle of Equal Sacri￿ce, a less
redistributive and historically prominent alternative criterion for optimal tax design. In that case, nearly
60 percent of respondents prefer the Equal Sacri￿ce alternative over the conventional Utilitarian objective.
Disagreement with the conventional Utilitarian assumption is even more striking when I give respondents a
range of choices, including options that are based in part on Utilitarianism and in part on Equal Sacri￿ce.
I ￿nd that 81 percent of individuals prefer policies other than the pure Utilitarian policy or the more
redistributive Rawlsian policy, and nearly half most prefer policies based on a combination of Utilitarianism
and Equal Sacri￿ce. This survey evidence suggests that key aspects of the policy implied by the Utilitarian
objective of conventional theory may not be, in the terminology of Diamond and Saez (2011), "socially
acceptable."3 That is, a large majority of individuals appear to place substantial value on an alternative
normative principle￿ Equal Sacri￿ce￿ that rejects the conventional objective￿ s policy implications.
While my ￿nding of a preference for a mixed objective is foreign to the optimal tax literature, it is
consistent with a large body of existing research showing that most individuals are not normative purists. In
that research, whether individuals are asked to evaluate income distributions, answer conceptual questions,
1Economists in general and optimal tax theorists in particular have largely embraced the defense of Utilitarianism given
by Harsanyi (1953), that expected utility maximization applies just as well to uncertainty across one￿ s place in society as it
does to one￿ s risky economic choices. Mirrlees (1971) used a generalized Utiltarianism in which the planner may take concave
transformations of individual utilities before summing across them. In the limit, this generalized Utilitarianism resembles the
Rawlsian priority on the least well-o⁄.
2See, e.g., Stiglitz 1987, Werning 2007, Rothschild and Scheuer 2012, and Saez and Stantcheva 2012 (also discussed later in
the Introduction). In addition, speci￿c normative limitations of the conventional model have been addressed directly. Fleurbaey
and Maniquet (2006) allow for considerations of fairness and responsibility with respect to preference heterogeneity. Besley and
Coate (1992) allow for society to place particular emphasis on poverty alleviation. This paper￿ s framework can accommodate
these concerns.
3In a recent, in￿uential overview Diamond and Saez (2011) argue that to be "fruitfully used as part of forming a policy
recommendation," a result from theory "needs to be socially acceptable," by which they mean "there should not be very widely
held normative views that make such policies seem implausible and inappropriate at pretty much all times."
2or participate in allocation games, few appear to use a single normative criterion. As Scott, Matland,
Michelbach, and Bornstein (2001) write: "Experimental research reveals that distributive justice judgments
usually involve several distinct allocation principles."
How should we respond to this evidence? One possible response is to ignore it. We may decide that a
normative theory ought to choose its objective based on philosophical reasoning, not popular opinion. If the
moral case for the conventional objective is strong enough, we may continue with the optimal tax project as
is, disregarding the apparent preferences of most people. An alternative approach is to incorporate as much
evidence as possible on the way the agents included in these models think about these very same issues.
Incorporating key aspects of reality into the conventional model has been a hallmark of major contributions
such as Diamond (1998), Saez (2001, 2002), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), and Farhi and Werning (2010),
and often these e⁄orts have improved the match between the theory￿ s recommendations and real-world
policy. Diamond and Saez (2011) suggest a similar e⁄ort with regard to the normative aspects of the model,
advocating a requirement of "social acceptability" under which real-world normative beliefs would constrain
the set of relevant policy results. My paper falls in this tradition and proposes that we go one step further:
it gathers formal evidence about people￿ s views and interprets that evidence as motivation for constructing
a positive optimal tax theory. The broad aim of this positive optimal taxation project is, then, to pursue
empirically-supported generalizations of the standard optimal tax model to better match the way in which
real societies appear to evaluate tax policy.4 Speci￿cally, this paper￿ s survey evidence, and a large body of
prior work, suggests that we generalize the standard model to include a mixed policy objective.
The second main contribution of this paper is to formally develop a generalized model that can be used
for positive optimal tax analysis. The generalized model combines multiple normative criteria into a single
policy objective while retaining both Pareto e¢ ciency and the remainder of the familiar formal apparatus
of conventional optimal tax theory. This generalization of the standard theory requires addressing long-
standing concerns about commensurability of di⁄erent normative criteria, and to my knowledge it represents
the ￿rst e⁄ort of its kind.5 In keeping with the survey evidence, I develop in depth the speci￿c case of an
objective that combines Utilitarianism and Equal Sacri￿ce.
A complementary approach to generalizing the conventional model￿ s objective￿ part of the Pareto-e¢ cient
optimal tax approach mentioned above￿ can be found in contemporaneous research by Saez and Stantcheva
(2012). They focus on the role of marginal social welfare weights in the aggregation of a given tax reform￿ s
e⁄ects on individuals. By allowing these weights to take any non-negative values, they include the possibility
that they may be based in part on normative criteria other than Utilitarianism.6 Their approach and this
paper￿ s can be seen as two sides of the same coin: one might translate a mixed objective function from my
approach into a pro￿le of marginal social welfare weights in theirs, or one might discipline the choice of
4Of course, some real-world policies are no doubt far from what would be desired by most people, and instead are due to
accident, political economy, and other factors. Identifying which aspects of policy truly re￿ect society￿ s preferences is a key
component of the development of positive optimal tax theory.
5In this way, I am following up on a suggestion made more than three decades ago by Martin Feldstein (1976), that "optimal
tax design involves a balancing of con￿icting criteria." An alternative approach to accommodating multiple objectives is to
solve for each objective￿ s recommendations separately and then consider how these recommendations interact. The approach in
this paper has two advantages over this alternative. First, perhaps the central challenge in combining objectives is to evaluate
allocations that are optimal according to none of the component criteria. The alternative approach fails to address this challenge,
leaving it unclear how di⁄erent criteria￿ s priorities would be integrated. Second, the interaction of criteria generates results
that would be di¢ cult to obtain through an interaction of their results. For example, this paper￿ s ￿nding that tagging may be
limited while substantial redistribution persists would not necessarily be obtained by combining the results of Utilitarianism
and Equal Sacri￿ce, as the former endorses both tagging and redistribution while the latter prohibits both. I am grateful to a
referee for a comment prompting this discussion.
6Saez and Stantcheva also note that welfare weights could be derived from existing policies or survey evidence. Bourguignon
and Spadaro (2012) take the former approach to calibrating the welfare weights in a standard model.
3welfare weights in their approach by seeing whether the mixed objective function from mine can produce
them using plausible normative criteria. Each approach has applications for which it is more naturally suited,
and both contribute toward the broader goal of constructing a positive theory of optimal taxation.
One attractive feature of this paper￿ s approach is that it requires a clear statement of the full set of criteria
by which policy is judged, avoiding the risk acknowledged by Saez and Stantcheva that "the endogenous
welfare weights might appear ad-hoc and speci￿ed exactly so as to explain the puzzle at hand."7 More
generally, under the Pareto-e¢ cient optimal tax approach, assumptions on the welfare weights are often
made in the interests of deriving more powerful results. One way to interpret my contribution in the context
of that approach is that I look for evidence on the normative criteria that seem to hold in reality and that,
therefore, might inform the values of those weights that society would endorse.
The third contribution of this paper is to show that this generalized model, when calibrated to this survey
evidence, has remarkable explanatory power for real-world tax policy. In particular, I simulate optimal policy
using the survey respondents￿most-preferred normative objective, which combines Utilitarianism and Equal
Sacri￿ce, and U.S. microdata. That policy quantitatively matches three aspects of the U.S. tax code that are
incompatible in conventional theory but widely endorsed in reality: it rejects the use of height, gender, and
race as tags; it accepts the use of blindness as a tag, endorsing a quantitatively realistic blindness bene￿t; and
it provides redistribution through a progressive schedule of average income tax rates that closely resembles
actual policy. Intuitively, a mix of Utilitarianism and Equal Sacri￿ce is able to match these features because
Equal Sacri￿ce alone cannot match observed redistribution and Utilitarianism alone cannot match limited
tagging. Moreover, I ￿nd direct evidence for Equal Sacri￿ce￿ s role in explaining limited tagging, as a greater
share of survey respondents who oppose height and blindness tags prefer policies based in part on Equal
Sacri￿ce. Beyond resolving this puzzle, this paper￿ s model has at least two additional appealing implications:
it substantially reduces the extent of utility rank reversals in the ￿rst-best policy, and it implies top marginal
tax rates lower than what conventional theory would recommend and closer to reality.
Taken together, the survey results, theoretical analysis, and calibrated simulations of this paper demon-
strate the potential of a positive optimal taxation research agenda. They show that we can rigorously capture
empirical evidence on what tax policies individuals ￿nd acceptable and, as one might hope, use the resulting
model to better understand how actual tax policy is and (arguably) ought to be designed.
The strong support that I ￿nd for policies based in part on Equal Sacri￿ce may seem surprising, but in
fact it ought not to be. Though Equal Sacri￿ce has played only a minor role in tax research since 1971, it
was originally proposed by no less a Utilitarian than John Stuart Mill, and it avoids the main critique of
Utilitarianism put forward by John Rawls, among others. In the early years of modern optimal tax theory,
Martin Feldstein (1976) saw a connection between Equal Sacri￿ce and Robert Nozick￿ s (1974) Libertarianism,
arguing that "...tax schedules that impose equal utility sacri￿ce have an appeal that is clearly lacking in
the utilitarian framework." The pioneering work of H. Peyton Young (1987, 1988, 1990, 1994) and Berliant
and Gouviea (1993) showed that existing income tax rate schedules were consistent with the Equal Sacri￿ce
principle by itself. In a sense, it would be surprising if Equal Sacri￿ce did not feature at least somewhat in
the views of many, especially in the United States.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 reports the new survey evidence on normative preferences
and discusses similar ￿ndings in prior work. Section 2 generalizes the standard model to allow for a mixed
7They go on explain that "However, we see this ￿exibility of our approach as a virtue that opens two new avenues of
investigation. First, endogenous welfare weights can be derived from social justice principles, leading to a normative theory of
taxation...Second, endogenous welfare weights could also be derived empirically, by estimating actual social preferences of the
public, leading to a positive theory of taxation." These avenues of implementing their approach are exactly those pursued in
this paper, making the deep connection between the approaches clear.
4objective, discusses Equal Sacri￿ce as an alternative to Utilitarianism, and applies the model to the case
of these two criteria. Section 3 shows that the parameterizations of that model most preferred by survey
respondents imply policies that resolve several disparities between conventional theory and real-world policy,
especially the puzzle of limited tagging. Section 4 concludes, and an Appendix contains supporting material.
1 New results on empirical normative preferences
In this section, I describe the design and results of a novel survey eliciting normative preferences over
realistic tax policies. I also provide a range of robustness checks, all of which con￿rm the main ￿ndings:
few individuals prefer the pure Utilitarian criterion standard in conventional optimal tax theory or the
commonly-used Rawlsian alternative, and a plurality of individuals prefer tax policies re￿ ecting a mixed
normative objective including both Utilitarianism and the classic alternative criterion of Equal Sacri￿ce.
This paper￿ s survey makes a methodological contribution to empirical research on tax preferences by,
for the ￿rst time as far as I am aware, having respondents face a task that mimics the conventional social
planner￿ s optimal tax problem. Especially novel are two features: one, respondents choose policies based on
both pre-tax and after-tax incomes; two, these policies are constrained by both feasibility (in the context of
government spending) and incentive compatability. These innovations over prior work allow me to use the
evidence on participant preferences to calibrate a fully-speci￿ed optimal policy model.
1.1 Survey design
The survey, shown in full in the Appendix, has three parts. The ￿rst part tests whether respondents
understand and can perform simple calculations related to the concepts of before-tax income, after-tax
income, and average tax rates. It de￿nes each of these terms, shows a graphical illustration of them that
parallels the ￿gures used in the remainder of the survey, and then asks four multiple-choice questions to
test comprehension. The third part of the survey asks respondents about their opinions on aspects of tax
policy, political views, and personal traits, including economic status. To address any concerns that these
characteristics matter for the results, I examine my ￿ndings￿robustness across all subgroups.
The second part is the centerpiece of the survey. Respondents are shown a graphical gross income
distribution divided into eight types of households.8 These types represent the four lower quintiles and a
division of the top quintile into the next 10, 5, 4, and 1 percentiles. To establish that di⁄erences in earnings
are not due to e⁄ort,9 the text states: "If there were no taxes, these households would all work equally hard.
But, type 2 would earn more than type 1, type 3 would earn more than type 2, and so on."
Respondents are then put in the position of objective policymakers facing a constrained optimal tax
problem. They are told "You are given the chance to choose taxes for this society. Please think of yourself
as a policymaker for this society." They are given information about the constraints facing their choice, as
the survey states the required level of exogenous government spending (i.e., feasibility) and emphasizes that
households￿labor supplies may respond to tax policy (i.e., incentive compatibility). Both of these constraints
are re￿ ected in the ￿gures. Respondents are reminded that taxes may serve a variety of purposes, from
funding public goods to redistributing before-tax income.
8This distribution is calculated based on data from the Congressional Budget O¢ ce for the United States in 2006. See the
discussion in Section 2.4.1 for details.
9If respondents attribute some of income variation to e⁄ort, rather than ability, they are likely to be less likely to endorse
redistributive criteria (see Lockwood and Weinzierl, 2012). Therefore, this clari￿cation makes it more likely that we will ￿nd
strong support for Utilitarianism.
5In a series of choices, respondents rank sets of tax policies. For each policy option, the survey displays
two overlapping income distributions (see Figure 1 below for an example). The pretax distribution is shown
as empty outlined columns while the aftertax distribution is shown as ￿lled-in green columns. The average
tax rate for each household type is shown in a text box above their columns. Respondents are asked to
rank the policies from "best" to "worst" by clicking on numbered radio buttons. By using the general terms
"best" and "worst" without further de￿ning the criteria by which tax policies ought to be judged, the survey
leaves the respondent free to use his or her own de￿nition of optimality.
The survey was listed in November, 2012 as an available task to up to 400 members of the Amazon
Mechanical Turk worker population from the United States who demonstrated good past performance on
tasks.10 The title of the task was "We want your opinions on tax policy", the description was "Rank possible
tax policies and give us your opinions on taxes," and the survey requestor was identi￿ed as "TaxSurvey."
Respondents had up to 30 minutes to complete the survey, and they were asked to enter their MTurk
identi￿cation number as well as a completion code at the end of the survey for veri￿cation purposes. The
respondents completed the survey in an average of 13 minutes and 6 seconds. They were paid $2.00 for the
task, implying an average hourly rate of $9.16.
1.2 Results
Respondents￿￿rst rankings provide straightforward evidence that the Utilitarian criterion is less popular
than the conventional model implies. Figure 1 shows the two policies respondents rank, labeled A and B.
Tax system A Tax system B
Figure 1: The choice between the Utilitarian policy A and the Equal Sacri￿ce policy B
In Section 2, I provide the details of how I calculated these (and all other) policy options in the survey.
For now, note simply that option A re￿ ects a conventional, pure Utilitarian objective for tax policy, while
option B re￿ ects an objective based entirely on the principle of Equal Sacri￿ce (which sets the utility cost
10Speci￿cally, only respondents registered as in the United States whose work had been accepted on 95 percent of previous
tasks could take the survey. Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser (2010) study the use of online labor markets, and speci￿cally of
Mechanical Turk, and ￿nd: "Online experiments, we show, can be just as valid￿ both internally and externally￿ as laboratory
and ￿eld experiments, while often requiring far less money and time to design and conduct."
6of taxation equal for all individuals). Policy A is redistributive, while B is not.
The results of this ￿rst choice are strikingly at odds with the conventional model￿ s assumed objective. The
share of respondents preferring the Utilitarian policy A is 42 percent, with a standard error of 2 percent. In
other words, nearly three-￿fths of respondents prefer the pure Equal Sacri￿ce policy B to the pure Utilitarian
policy A.
Respondents are then asked, over the course of two questions, to rank a wider range of seven policy
options. These seven include the two policies from the ￿rst choice (the Utilitarian option A and the Equal
Sacri￿ce option B); three intermediate policies that are weighted combinations of A and B (namely E, D, and
G); and two more extreme policies, a Rawlsian policy C and a lump-sum "poll tax" policy F. Respondents
￿rst compare option A to three additional options, two of which are less redistributive than A, namely
D and E, while C is more redistributive. Respondents then compare option B from the ￿rst choice to
three additional options, two of which are more redistributive than B, namely D and G, while F is less
redistributive. Both choices can be seen in the survey as reproduced in the Appendix. Policy D is included
in both sets of four-option rankings so that we can infer respondents￿preferences across the full range of
seven policies.11 Note that the redistributive spectrum is masked in both the alphabetical policy labels and
the physical placement of policies within the four-policy rankings (visible in the Appendix).
Figure 2 shows each of these seven policy options and the share of respondents who placed them in their
top-ranked or second-ranked group of policies.12
Figure 2: Respondent preferences across a range of policy
options
11An alternative approach would be to give the respondents control over a continuous policy lever that would trace out the
entire range of redistribution (for instance, ￿ES). That alternative has two drawbacks, however. First, communicating the
meaning of that policy lever would be di¢ cult without in￿uencing the respondents￿answers. Second, we are likely interested
not merely in the respondents￿ideal points but in their attitudes toward options along the entire range. Those would be di¢ cult
to elicit with this alternative approach.
12These classi￿cations are made as follows. Using option D, which was included in both of the four-option policy choices, we
can create a weak ranking of all seven policy options for each respondent. The top-ranked group includes any policy strictly
dominated by no other policy. Less than six percent of respondents had more than one top-ranked policy. The second-ranked
group includes any policy strictly dominated by only policies in the top-ranked group. For example, if a respondent ranks
option D as their ￿rst choice in both four-option choices, they will rank two policies second, each of which is therefore placed
in the "second-ranked" group for that respondent.
7Figure 2 reveals two main results from these rankings: one, support for the conventional Utiltarianism
assumption and the Rawlsian alternative is low; two, a plurality of respondents prefer a mixed objective.13
The purely Utilitarian policy (A) makes up only 10 percent of the top-ranked choices and 11 percent of the
second-ranked choices. For the Rawlsian alternative, these ￿gures are 9 percent and 10 percent. Together,
then, policies at least as redistributive as the conventional Utilitarianism make up less than 20 percent
of the most-preferred policies in this survey, the same share claimed by the pure Equal Sacri￿ce policy
B. In contrast, nearly half￿ 48 percent￿ of the top-ranked policies were one of the three (E, D, and G) that
correspond to a mixed normative criterion. These mixed policies also dominate the second-ranked preferences
of respondents, making up 56 percent of those choices.
Together, these results sharply contradict the normative assumptions that dominate modern optimal tax
research. Respondents give little support to using the conventional Utilitarian criterion as the optimal policy
benchmark. They also appear to disagree with the most commonly used alternative to pure Utilitarianism￿ a
more concave social welfare function￿ as respondents are less enthusiastic about the Rawlsian policy than
any other option except (perhaps) the poll tax. Instead, empirical normative preferences appear to favor the
use of a mixed objective with some weight on a less redistributive criterion such as Equal Sacri￿ce.
Further evidence of a preference for an objective that combines Utilitarianism with Equal Sacri￿ce is
revealed when respondents are asked explicitly about the optimal distribution of sacri￿ce in a tax system:
The responses to this question are as follows: 33 percent choose the ￿rst option; 48 percent choose the second;
and 19 percent choose the third option. As these responses demonstrate, the preference for mixed objectives
that was apparent in respondents￿choices over tax systems is echoed by their stated preferences over the
distribution of sacri￿ce from the tax system. The conventional Utilitarian policy is most consistent with the
third option in this question, though it would in fact recommend a more redistributive option in which the
poor received a net bene￿t from the tax system. The pure Equal Sacri￿ce policy is most consistent with the
￿rst option. One-￿fth of the survey respondents show enthusiasm for the conventional Utilitarian outcome,
one-third support the Equal Sacri￿ce alternative, and nearly one-half choose the intermediate option. In
other words, approximately four out of ￿ve respondents choose policies re￿ ecting some weight on Equal
Sacri￿ce, the same share as in the choices over tax policies as shown in Figure 2.
Finally, Figure 3 shows a degree of consistency that suggests the survey is accurately eliciting respondents￿
policy preferences. It shows these preferences according to individuals￿views on Equal Sacri￿ce. Policy option
B, based purely on Equal Sacri￿ce, claims more than twice the share of the top rankings among those who
state a preference for equal sacri￿ce than among those who prefer distributing sacri￿ce less equally. This
pattern holds despite that connection never being made apparent in the survey. Similarly, the Utilitarian and
Rawlsian policies are supported more by those who prefer to have the poor bear no sacri￿ce, and intermediate
13Note that the survey was designed to minimize the risk that aversion to choosing endpoints is generating the observed
preference for the intermediate policies D, E, and G. Each of the two scenarios in which respondents chose between four policies
had policy D as an endpoint option. In contrast, policies A and B were intermediate policies in each of their four-option
scenarios.
8policies are supported more by those who prefer the intermediate distribution of sacri￿ce.
Figure 3: Policy preferences by view on Equal Sacri￿ce
1.3 Robustness
Here, I analyze the data along several dimensions to check the robustness of these results.
1.3.1 Respondents￿understanding
If respondents fail to understand the questions being asked, we might worry that their answers poorly re￿ ect
their true preferences. Two sets of observations o⁄er reassurance on this point.
First, respondents appear to understand the economic concepts used in the survey. The survey begins
with de￿nitions of the concepts of before-tax income, after-tax income and the average tax rate. It then
asks respondents to: 1) use before-tax income and taxes paid to calculate after-tax income; 2) use before-
tax income and taxes paid to calculate a (positive) average tax rate; 3) use before-tax income and taxes
paid to calculate a (negative) average tax rate; 4) calculate the average of three before-tax incomes. These
questions test comprehension and the ability to work with the concepts, as well as numeracy. The results
show that respondent understanding was very high, with 75 percent of respondents correctly answering all
four questions and 87 percent answering at least three correctly.
Second, the pattern of rankings by most respondents suggests they understood the choices they were
making. If a respondent reports single-peaked preferences across the ￿ve policy options along the spectrum
between pure Utilitarianism and Equal Sacri￿ce, we might be con￿dent in his or her understanding of the
relationship among policies, not to mention the respondent￿ s rationality. In fact, 68 percent of respondents
exhibited single-peaked preferences across these ￿ve policy choices. Importantly, that result does not imply
that 32 percent of respondents were making irrational choices￿ someone may prefer policies that commit fully
to one normative criterion or another, for example.
91.3.2 Robustness across demographic groups
Natural concerns in any survey of this kind are whether the results are driven by particular demographic
groups and whether economic status is systematically related to respondents￿preferences. To examine these
concerns, I ask respondents to report their gender, age, education, and economic status when young and
when an adult. Summary demographic data for the 381 respondents who successfully completed the survey
is provided in Table 1.
Though not meant to be a representative sample, this group exhibits substantial variation in (self-
reported) personal characteristics and backgrounds. The self-reported distribution of respondents across
household types when they were children matches the overall U.S. income distribution remarkably well, with
36 percent reporting being from the bottom two quintiles, 45 percent from the next two quintiles, and 19
percent from the top quintile. The respondent population also appears to be (or to expect to be) upwardly
mobile, with only about one-quarter of those who report their childhood household most resembled one of
the two lowest-earning household types reporting that their household at age 40 was also one of those types.
Consistent with that fact, the respondents were generally more well-educated than the population aged 18-65
in the United States, where approximately 30 percent of adults are college graduates.14
Table 1: Preferences across policy groups by demographic trait
Tax policy group: Rawls or Utilitarian Mixed Equal Sacri￿ce Share of
(C or A) (E, D, or G) (B) respondents
Gender
Male 0.16 0.48 0.23 0.56
Female 0.24 0.47 0.16 0.44
Age
18-25 0.16 0.52 0.17 0.30
26-40 0.23 0.49 0.19 0.48
41-65 0.18 0.40 0.25 0.21
Education
High school grad 0.21 0.36 0.29 0.13
Some college 0.20 0.48 0.18 0.35
College grad 0.19 0.52 0.18 0.51
Status when child
Types 1-2 (lower) 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.36
Types 3-4 (middle) 0.19 0.50 0.19 0.45
Types 5-8 (higher) 0.16 0.55 0.17 0.19
Status when adult
Types 1-2 (lower) 0.31 0.28 0.24 0.16
Types 3-4 (middle) 0.19 0.50 0.19 0.51
Types 5-8 (higher) 0.15 0.55 0.18 0.33
Table 1 also shows that there are few large di⁄erences in preferred policies across demographic groups. In
the table, I group policies into three groups: Utilitarian or Rawlsian (C or A); Mixed (E, D, or G); and Equal
14See Table 229 of the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, published by the U.S. Census Bureau.
10Sacri￿ce (B).15 Respondents with less education tend to be more supportive of redistributive policies, and
respondents￿economic status as adults tends to be negatively related to support for redistribution. However,
a large majority of each demographic group prefers policies other than the Utilitarian or Rawlsian options,
and a plurality of all but one group (which supports Equal Sacri￿ce) prefers policies that result from a mixed
normative criterion that combines Utilitarianism and Equal Sacri￿ce. Thus, both main ￿ndings from the
full survey apply across demographic groups.
1.3.3 Robustness across political views
A major conceptual question raised by this paper￿ s results is how individuals￿preferences are aggregated
in a political system. Though I largely set that question aside, we can analyze the survey results to test
whether the paper￿ s main conclusions are likely to be sensitive to the details of that aggregation. For
example, if we found that individuals of only a particular political perspective were driving the results, we
might discount their relevance. To address these concerns, I ask respondents to self-classify at three points
on the (U.S.) political spectrum with regard to economic issues: 1) Left-leaning, or Liberal; 2) Centrist,
or Moderate; 3) Right-leaning, or Conservative. I also ask them to classify themselves as (strongly or
somewhat) supportive of or opposed to Libertarianism (which is left unde￿ned in the survey). Table 2 shows
the distribution of responses. A plurality of the respondents, 44 percent, self-classi￿es as left-leaning.16
Support for Libertarianism in this sample is consistent with the magnitudes for the U.S. population cited
by Boaz and Kirby (2007).
Table 2 also shows that both main ￿ndings from the full survey characterize respondents across a wide
range of political opinions.
Table 2: Preferences across policy groups by political views
Tax policy group: Rawls or Utilitarian Mixed Equal Sacri￿ce Share of
(C or A) (E, D, or G) (B) respondents
Political position
Left-leaning 0.19 0.57 0.11 0.42
Centrist 0.21 0.52 0.18 0.30
Right-leaning 0.18 0.29 0.37 0.22
View on Libertarianism
Support 0.17 0.42 0.25 0.46
Oppose 0.19 0.57 0.15 0.27
As might be expected, right-leaning and Libertarian respondents are more likely to favor less redistributive
policies. However, across all groups, and even among those who self-classify as left-leaning or liberal, a large
majority of respondents prefer policies other than those re￿ ecting conventional objectives, and a plurality
prefer a mixed normative framework with some weight on Equal Sacri￿ce.
15I do not show the results for the Poll Tax because it received little support and is too distinct from the Equal Sacri￿ce
policy to be grouped with it.
16We might expect this group to be more supportive of redistributive policy than a sample centered on the "centrist" position.
111.4 Relation to existing evidence on normative preferences
This paper￿ s survey evidence and the large body of prior empirical work on normative preferences share
a common main conclusion: individuals use and prefer a mixed normative criteria. In the Appendix, I
discuss the related research in detail, but summary statements from studies representing the three research
designs in that literature illustrate the main point. Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavey (1987) use surveys
in which participants are asked to rank di⁄erent distributions of resources, much as in this paper, and ￿nd
that "...subjects preferred a compromise. This implies that individuals treat choice between principles as
involving marginal decisions. Principles are much like economic goods inasmuch as individuals are willing
to trade o⁄ between them [italics in the original]." Feldman and Zaller (1992) ask a large group of Americans
open-ended questions on distributive justice and write: "Most people are internally con￿ icted about exactly
what kind of welfare system they want...Ambivalence with respect to social welfare policy is more pronounced
among welfare liberals...They end up acknowledging the values of economic individualism even as they try
to justify their liberal preferences." Englemann and Strobel (2004) use allocation games among individuals
to elicit values and conclude: "a combination of e¢ ciency concerns, maximin preferences, and sel￿shness
can rationalize most of the data." As these statements demonstrate, the ￿ndings of this paper￿ s survey are
consistent with and build on a substantial base of prior work.
2 Generalizing the optimal tax model for multiple objectives
The survey results and related literature presented in the previous section suggest two lessons for a positive
theory of optimal taxation: ￿rst, the conventional optimal tax model￿ s assumption of a Utilitarian objective
is counterfactually narrow; second, an accurate positive optimal tax theory must be able to accommodate
multiple normative objectives simultaneously. In this section, I generalize the conventional model to allow for
this normative diversity, retaining much of the standard theory￿ s (familiar) formal apparatus. I then develop
the details of that model for the case of the two main normative criteria used in the survey: Utilitarianism
and Equal Sacri￿ce. Finally, I show the parameterizations of the model that correspond to the policies
o⁄ered to survey respondents.
2.1 The general model with multiple criteria
Appealing as it may be to generalize the normative objective in the optimal tax model, there is a method-
ological obstacle: many plausible normative criteria evaluate outcomes in ways that are not directly com-
mensurable. For example, Utilitarianism ranks all possible allocations, but Equal Sacri￿ce yields only a
most-preferred outcome and fails to rank alternative allocations. To obtain a ranking of allocations that
re￿ ects the judgments of both criteria therefore requires a translation of Equal Sacri￿ce into a more complete
form. This case is an example of a more general problem.17
This paper ensures commensurability by representing the priorities of each normative criterion with a
loss function that depends on deviations of the actual allocation of resources from each criterion￿ s optimal
allocation. Of course, specifying these loss functions is a matter of judgment, and some may object to their
17For example, Utilitarianism has a consequentialist (i.e., welfarist) criterion, namely maximal aggregate utility, that ranks all
possible allocations based exclusively on the utility levels of the individuals in society. In contrast, some normative frameworks
stress the moral relevance of concerns such as freedom, rights, and rules, rather than the ends emphasized by Utilitarianism.
These frameworks are often referred to as deontological, and a long-standing concern in moral philosophy is whether the
judgments of consequentalist and deontological frameworks can be compared.
12use altogether. In the end, the appeal of my analysis will depend on how closely the optimal allocations and
loss functions I use align with the priorities of the normative criteria. An important feature of this approach
is that these loss functions can be speci￿ed in a way that respects Pareto e¢ ciency, as the examples below
illustrate, avoiding the problem with non-welfarist criteria noted by Kaplow and Shavell (2001).
Thus, the key formal innovation in this paper￿ s generalization of the standard model is that the social
planner minimizes a "social loss function" that is the weighted sum of these criterion-speci￿c losses. The
weight on a given criterion￿ s loss represents the force that criterion exerts on society￿ s moral evaluations.
The social planner is therefore interpreted as an authority using a diverse normative criterion that is the
product of an (unspeci￿ed) political process.
This loss-minimization approach to combining disparate normative criteria appears to be consistent with
the "consequential evaluation" of Amartya Sen (2000).18 Sen does not specify how these criteria ought to be
combined, but a suggestive passage indicates that my approach of social loss minimization may not be far
o⁄ the mark: "...rights-inclusive objectives in a system of consequential evaluation can accommodate certain
rights the ful￿llment of which would be excellent but not guaranteed, and we can still try to minimize the
shortfall."
In most other respects, the model economy in this paper is identical to that considered in standard
modern optimal tax models. Individuals di⁄er in their innate ability to earn income, denoted wi for types
i 2 f1;2;:::;Ig, with the proportion of the population with ability i denoted pi such that
P I
i=1pi = 1.
Individuals derive utility from consumption c and disutility from exerting labor e⁄ort y=w to earn income
y. Denote the utility function U (c;y=w).19
A planner chooses allocations
￿
ci
￿;yi
￿
￿I
i=1 to minimize social loss subject to feasibility and incentive
compatibility constraints. Formally, the planner￿ s problem is:
Problem 1 Social planner￿ s problem (general case)
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where the criterion-speci￿c loss functions L￿ for each criterion ￿ in the set ￿ are de￿ned below;
F denotes the set of feasible allocations for the economy:
F =
(
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where G is exogenous, required government spending on public goods;
IC denotes the set of incentive compatible allocations:
IC =
n￿
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: (3)
The weights f￿￿g￿2￿ applied to each loss function represent the importance of each normative criterion
in society￿ s evaluations of policy. A number of models of the policymaking process could be used to generate
18In Sen (1982) he writes: "...both welfarist consequentialism (such as utilitarianism) and constraint-based deontology are
fundamentally inadequate because of their failure to deal with certain important types of interdependences present in moral
problems. This leads to an alternative approach... which incorporates, among other things, some types of rights in the evaluation
of states of a⁄airs, and which gives these rights in￿uence on the choice of actions through the evaluation of consequent states
of a⁄airs."
19As in most optimal tax analyses, I assume utilities are interpersonally comparable.
13such weights. The most straightforward is that the pivotal voter has his or her own weights on each normative
criterion, adopted by policymakers as a result of electoral competition.20 One implication of this paper￿ s
analysis is that future research estimating the values of these weights and how they are generated by the
political process would be valuable.
The losses to which these weights apply are calculated using two components that, together, capture the
priorities of each normative criterion.
First, each criterion generates a preferred, economically-feasible allocation of consumption and income
across types, which I label the "￿-optimal feasible allocation." To identify these allocations, start by assuming
that each normative criterion ￿ 2 ￿ implies a (possibly incomplete) preference relation ￿￿ on the set F, so
that we say allocation
￿
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Given ￿￿, the strict preference relation ￿￿ is de￿ned as usual. For any
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These preference relations allow the identi￿cation of the ￿-optimal feasible allocations, which I denote n
ci
￿;yi
￿
oI
i=1
, and formally de￿ne as follows.
De￿nition 1 An ￿-optimal feasible allocation
n
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is any allocation in the set F for which there is
no other allocation
￿
ci;yi￿I
i=1 in the set F such that:
￿
ci;yi￿I
i=1 ￿￿
n
ci
￿;yi
￿
oI
i=1
:
These ￿-optimal feasible allocations provide a key link across normative criteria.
Note that no incentive compatibility constraints are imposed when de￿ning the ￿-optimal feasible al-
locations, so that they equal each criterion￿ s "￿rst-best" allocation in this context (i.e., when ability is
observable). Omitting incentive compatibility constraints enables the ￿-optimal feasible allocations to pro-
vide a stable target for each criterion against which to measure the appeal of di⁄erent policy proposals. The
alternative, namely to use a "second-best" allocation, requires assumptions on the planner￿ s information set
that can lead to path-dependencies in policy evaluations and, thus, unstable judgments.21 The problem is
that no obvious principle exists by which to determine which information is to be included or excluded from
the planner￿ s information set when de￿ning ￿-optimal feasible allocations.22 No such inconsistency exists if
the information set includes all possible information.
20If one wished to consider, instead, di⁄erent groups engaged in a policy-setting game, alternative approaches could be used.
For example, the Nash bargaining solution would optimize a weighted combination of their interests. "Veto" models such as
that in Moulin (1981) would allow a coalition of voters to block some alternatives. Such formulations are conceptually similar
to this paper￿ s, as the key to this paper￿ s results is not the speci￿c formalization of the tradeo⁄ between normative criteria but
rather that the tradeo⁄ is included at all.
21An example will illustrate this best. Recall that for each criterion ￿, loss is calculated by comparing the distributions of
individual utility under the ￿-optimal feasible allocation and the actual, constrained allocation. Consider two cases for how
to de￿ne the ￿-optimal feasible allocations. In case 1, allow the planner to condition taxes on ability. In case 2, assume that
the planner cannot condition taxes on ability but can condition taxes on gender, an observable characteristic related to ability
in the data. The distributions of utility in the ￿-optimal feasible allocations for these two cases will di⁄er. Now suppose we
want to gauge the appeal of conditioning taxes on height or race (as in Section 3 below). Assume that height and gender are
correlated but race and gender are not. Then, the use of gender in de￿ning the ￿-optimal feasible allocations in case 2 will
di⁄erentially a⁄ect the loss calculations for the allocations that use a height tax or a race tax. By the same reasoning, if we
allowed a di⁄erent trait to be used in case 2, the relative appeal of height and race taxes would be a⁄ected yet di⁄erently.
22In particular, note that limiting the information set to the standard observables of optimal tax theory, namely income
and consumption, does not solve the problem. Even in that case, evaluating a height-gender-race combination tag may yield
di⁄erent results than evaluating each tag separately, whether one-by-one or cumulatively.
14Second, each criterion￿ s priorities are represented by a loss function that measures the costs of deviations
from the criterion￿ s most preferred allocation. I denote these loss functions L￿
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The loss functions fL￿g￿2￿ that I use in this paper satisfy the following three conditions. The ￿rst two
are straightforward. The third, Pareto E¢ ciency, may be more controversial among political philosophers
but is generally viewed as a reasonable requirement in the optimal taxation literature.23
Remark 1 For all ￿ 2 ￿, the loss function L￿ (x;y) satis￿es:
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so that the loss from one allocation is no greater than that from another to which it is weakly preferred
under criterion ￿;
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= 0, so that the loss is zero24 when the equilibrium
allocation equals the ￿-optimal feasible allocation.
3. Weak Pareto E¢ ciency:
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which can be converted into Strong Pareto E¢ ciency if desired.25
In words, Weak Pareto E¢ ciency as de￿ned here says that if all individuals do at least as well under
allocation 1 as they do under allocation 2, the loss from allocation 1 cannot be greater than the loss from
allocation 2. This condition will prevent the planner from rejecting Pareto-improving allocations. It is too
weak, however, to guarantee that the planner will avoid Pareto-ine¢ cient allocations￿ for that, Strong Pareto
E¢ ciency is required.26
Together, ￿-optimal feasible allocations and loss functions allow us to make commensurable a diversity
of normative frameworks that, then, can jointly in￿ uence the determination of optimal policy. Below, I
apply this general approach to the case of the two main criteria between which I have respondents to the
survey choose: the conventional Utilitarian criterion and the principle of Equal Sacri￿ce. First, I provide
some background on why Equal Sacri￿ce is a natural choice as the alternative to Utilitarianism.
2.2 Equal Sacri￿ce as an alternative to Utilitarianism
John Stuart Mill (1871) was the most famous proponent of Equal Sacri￿ce, and his argument for it is worth
quoting at length.
23See, for examples of contrasting views, Sen and Williams (1982, introductory chapter) and Kaplow and Shavell (2001).
24Any constant would accomplish the same normalization, though zero is the natural choice.
25Namely, U
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26The Strong Pareto E¢ ciency condition states, in words, that if all individuals do at least as well under allocation 1 as
under allocation 2, and at least one individual does better, then the loss from allocation 1 must be strictly less than the loss
from allocation 2.
15"For what reason ought equality to be the rule in matters of taxation? For the reason, that it
ought to be so in all a⁄airs of government...Equality of taxation, therefore, as a maxim of politics,
means equality of sacri￿ce. It means apportioning the contribution of each person towards the
expenses of government so that he shall feel neither more nor less inconvenience from his share
of the payment than every other person experiences from his."
To Mill, the appeal of Equal Sacri￿ce was simple: it treats all individuals equally. This argument for
Equal Sacri￿ce was endorsed by other in￿ uential thinkers, including Alfred Marshall and Henry Sidgwick,
the latter of whom claimed it was the "obviously equitable principle￿ assuming that the existing distribution
of wealth is accepted as just or not unjust." 27
Utilitarianism, in contrast, is willing to trade the losses of some for greater gains of others, a willingness
that thinkers as diverse as John Rawls and Robert Nozick have seen as a serious failing. The speci￿c context
in which this concern has been seen as most forceful is "endowment" taxation, where individuals would be
taxed on their potential to earn income rather than their actual earned income.28 Of course, endowment
taxation is exactly the preferred policy of the conventional Utilitarian optimal tax model. Rawls (1971)
wrote that Utilitarianism "does not take seriously the distinction between persons," and that an endowment
tax "would force the more able into those occupations in which earnings were high enough for them to pay
o⁄ the tax in the required period of time; it would interfere with their liberty to conduct their life within the
scope of the principles of justice."29 The broad force of this critique is made clear when it is coupled with
Robert Nozick￿ s (1974) claim that "taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor" because
"it is like forcing the person to work n hours for another￿ s purpose." While Rawls and Nozick take from their
critiques very di⁄erent lessons, they share a similar target: Utilitarianism￿ s potential to violate individual
liberty due to its acceptance of unequal treatment.30
This critique of Utilitarianism makes clear why Mill￿ s Equal Sacri￿ce, with its emphasis on equal treat-
ment of all individuals, is a natural alternative normative criterion. Relatedly, some have suggested that
there is an explicit connection between Equal Sacri￿ce and Libertarianism. As noted earlier, Feldstein (1976)
writes: "Nozick (1974) has recently presented an extensive criticism of the use of utilitarian principles to
justify the redistribution of income and wealth...In this context, the principle of bene￿t taxation or of tax
schedules that impose equal utility sacri￿ce have an appeal that is clearly lacking in the utilitarian frame-
work." Similarly, Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel (2002) have argued: "If (and only if) [libertarianism]
is the theory of distributive justice we accept, the principle of equal sacri￿ce does make sense." Sidgwick￿ s
statement above, with its caveat that speaks to the core of Libertarianism, suggests the same link.
A priority on equal treatment may be of paramount concern to only a small minority of individuals, but
evidence strongly suggests that it has at least some appeal to most. Public opinion surveys, including this
27In addition to the work of H. Peyton Young and Berliant and Gouveia mentioned earlier, Yaari (1988), Moyes (1989),
Ok (1995), Mitra and Ok (1996), and D￿ Antoni (1999) helped established conditions on the progressivity of taxes designed
in accordance with Equal Sacri￿ce and argue for the centrality of that principle. Lambert and Naughton (2009) is a recent
contribution that reviews much of this literature.
28Legal scholars have extensively analyzed this issue with endowment (ability) taxation under the heading of "talent slavery,"
the heavy taxation of those with high ability that forces them to work exceptionally hard or at an occupation they dislike. See,
for instance, Hasen (2007), Markovits (2003), Rakowski (2000), Shaviro (2002), Stark (2005), Sugin (2011), and Zelenak (2006).
29This latter quote is from Rawls (2001). Political philosophers and legal scholars have developed this critique in depth. As
an example of the former, see Mazor (2012) and Richard Arneson (2000), who writes: "It is better to regard Rawls as making
the point that ...it is a ￿aw that utilitarianism would have the decision about what should be done vary only with the utility
total that di⁄erent acts could achieve."
30Stark (2005) o⁄ers a detailed argument that the concerns of Rawls and Nozick are closely connected. A related perspective
is captured in Immanuel Kant￿ s (1785) dictum "to treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same
time as ends in themselves."
16paper￿ s, estimate that the proportion of individuals with largely Libertarian views is 10 to 20 percent in
the United States (Boaz and Kirby 2007).31 But, research has shown that even those predisposed toward
redistribution feel some pull toward normative principles that prioritize the individual.32 Feldman and
Zaller￿ s (1992) statement cited in Section 1.4 makes this point, and this paper￿ s survey evidence clearly
supports that conclusion. As Feldstein (1976) noted: "Those who are fully persuaded by Nozick will thus
completely rede￿ne the problem of optimal taxation. Others will reject Nozick completely...Many will be
persuaded that the entitlement principle limits the desirable degree of redistribution."
Mill himself provides a telling example of exactly this form of mixed normative reasoning, writing ap-
provingly of both Equal Sacri￿ce and minimal total sacri￿ce (which is similar to the Utilitarian criterion):
As a government ought to make no distinction of persons or classes in the strength of their
claims on it, whatever sacri￿ces it requires from them should be made to bear as nearly as possible
with the same pressure upon all, which, it must be observed, is the mode by which least sacri￿ce
is occasioned on the whole.
Mill is incorrect, as many others have noted, in the assertion that Equal Sacri￿ce implies minimized total
sacri￿ce. But this mistake reveals that, for Mill, both equal and minimized total sacri￿ce were principles he
believed appealing and likely to be accepted by his readers. Mill￿ s split normative intuition is more the rule
than the exception, and I explore the implications of it in this paper.
2.3 A two-criterion case: Utilitarianism and Equal Sacri￿ce
In this section, I apply the general approach from above to the case of the two main criteria used in the
survey of Section 1: the Utilitarian criterion of maximal aggregate utility and the principle of Equal Sacri￿ce.
2.3.1 ￿-optimal feasible allocations
The ￿rst step in this application is to de￿ne the preference relations that determine the ￿-optimal feasible
allocations. The preference relation for Utilitarianism is familiar from the conventional optimal tax literature:
allocations are preferred that generate a greater sum of individual utilities. Formally, ￿Util is de￿ned by:
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The Utilitarian-optimal feasible allocation is therefore:
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The preference relation for the principle of Equal Sacri￿ce requires more discussion. The key question is
from what starting point is each individual￿ s sacri￿ce to be calculated? Though one could defend a number of
31Cappelen et al. (2011) conduct experiments in which participants￿choices imply a preference among competing "fairness
ideals," and in their preferred speci￿cation 18.7 percent of participants are classi￿ed as "libertarians." Konow (2003) reports
results consistent with these magnitudes.
32Though the connection to problems of taxation is imperfect, Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Kurki (2004) show that "just
deserts" or "entitlements" exert an in￿uence on allocations for most dictators in allocation games with production.
17choices for that starting point, one natural option is the allocation that would obtain absent any government
intervention, i.e., the no-tax allocation. In particular, the allocation with no taxation is the preferred
allocation of the Libertarian framework with which the principle of equal sacri￿ce has been linked. As Liam
Murphy and Thomas Nagel (2002) have argued: "The implication for tax policy of rights-based libertarianism
in its pure or absolute form is that no compulsory taxation is legitimate..." For clarity, I will refer to the
allocation with no taxation as the laissez-faire allocation and formally de￿ne it as follows.
De￿nition 2 The laissez-faire allocation,
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These conditions are simply that each individual maximizes utility and there are no interpersonal trans-
fers. In the statement of the de￿nition, I clarify that G = 0, as this is the allocation with no government.
A well-known conceptual issue with the idea of the laissez-faire allocation is that any economy is, in
reality, inseparable from the government and state institutions that taxes fund. The laissez-faire allocation
is, therefore, not well-de￿ned, because G = 0 implies a very di⁄erent economy than that the status quo.
Without a well-de￿ned starting point, calculating "sacri￿ce" is impossible. In formal terms, if G > 0 is
required for the status quo economy to function, the laissez-faire allocation is not in the feasible set F.
Fortunately, though I am not aware of this being recognized before, the Equal Sacri￿ce principle provides
a natural way to convert the infeasible hypothetical laissez-faire allocation into a feasible one. Consider the
following thought experiment. Suppose that the public goods necessary to support the current economy are
sustained without any cost to the economy, so that G = 0 but the status quo economic system is feasible.
According to Equal Sacri￿ce, the (no tax) laissez-faire outcome in this scenario is surely optimal, as it satis￿es
Equal Sacri￿ce with the smallest possible uniform sacri￿ce￿ that is, zero￿ for all individuals. Now, suppose
that sustaining those public goods is costly, so that G > 0. The Equal Sacri￿ce principle implies that the
cost of the public goods will be distributed across individuals such that the utility loss is identical (and as
small as possible) for all.
Formally, de￿ne ES as the set of all feasible allocations that satisfy the principle of Equal Sacri￿ce relative
to the laissez-faire allocation:
ES =
n￿
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o
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(6)
The Equal Sacri￿ce preference relation, denoted ￿ES; indicates that one allocation in ES is preferred to
another if it generates a smaller uniform sacri￿ce:
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i=1 2 ES and for any i 2 f1;2;:::;Ig:
Consequently, the ES-optimal feasible allocation is that which achieves the smallest equal sacri￿ce while
funding G. Formally, we de￿ne
￿
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ES;yi
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￿I
i=1 as follows:
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;
18for any i 2 f1;2;:::;Ig and for all possible
￿
ci;yi￿I
i=1 2 ES:
Even with this technical solution, a prominent normative concern remains: is the ES-optimal feasible
allocation a just starting point?33 Many tax specialists and political philosophers argue that the laissez-faire
allocation, and by implication the ES-optimal feasible allocation, is not. But this paper takes a positive
perspective on the objective for taxation, and the evidence suggests that most individuals support Equal
Sacri￿ce de￿ned in this way. In particular, as will be made clear in Section 2.4, the survey evidence of
Section 1 shows that most respondents prefer a tax policy re￿ ecting some weight on Equal Sacri￿ce with
sacri￿ce calculated from the ES-optimal feasible allocation. Moreover, when they are asked about the proper
distribution of "sacri￿ce" from taxes, respondents endorse a more equal distribution than the conventional
Utiltarian model would suggest. Though the interpretation of this result is debatable in many ways, it
strongly suggests that most respondents do not believe the existing economic distribution is unjust in a way
that merits substantial redistribution.
Once we have speci￿ed the ￿-optimal feasible allocations, the next step is to specify the loss functions
for the planner.
2.3.2 Loss functions
The Utilitarian loss function LUtil is:
LUtil
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: (8)
In words, it is the sum of individuals￿utility losses from having the equilibrium allocation
￿
ci
￿;yi
￿
￿
i deviate
from the Utilitarian-optimal feasible allocation. This loss function has the appealing property that it di-
rectly adopts the cardinal welfare comparisons underlying the Utilitarian preference relation and, thus, the
conventional optimal tax model.34 Note that it converts the familiar goal of aggregate utility maximization
into aggregate sacri￿ce minimization.
Unlike Utilitarianism, the Equal Sacri￿ce criterion does not rank allocations that deviate from its pre-
ferred allocation. As far as I am aware, no previous work has studied how to obtain a complete ranking of
allocations based on Equal Sacri￿ce. While my approach is, therefore, by necessity somewhat speculative, I
design the Equal Sacri￿ce loss function to re￿ ect the priorities of that principle. In words, these priorities
are simple: deviations from equal sacri￿ce are costly, even if they reduce the aggregate level of sacri￿ce, and
outcomes with less sacri￿ce for some and no more for all are preferred (i.e., Pareto e¢ ciency). Of course,
future research may discover alternative speci￿cations that prove more useful.
I will assume an Equal Sacri￿ce loss function LES with three features: ￿rst, deviations of individual utility
below the ES-optimal feasible allocation are costly but deviations above the ES-optimal feasible allocation
yield little or no o⁄setting bene￿ts;35 second, losses increase more than proportionally with the size of the
deviation of individual utility below the ES-optimal feasible allocation; third, gains are concave in the size
of the deviation of individual utility above the ES-optimal feasible allocation.
33The caveat in Sidgwick￿ s earlier statement in support of Equal Sacri￿ce directly raises this issue.
34An alternative approach would be to use a common loss function for all criteria. While this has the seeming advantage of
consistency, it in fact would lead to pathologies. For example, if full weight were put on the Utilitarian criterion, but the loss
function used was not the same as expression (8), the model would yield a di⁄erent ranking of policies than the conventional
Utilitarian model.
35This property is consistent with the classic "loss aversion" of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). However, equal sacri￿ce is
not consistent with the diminishing sensitivity to losses that is part of classic prospect theory.
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for scalars f￿ ￿ 0; ￿ > ￿, ￿ 2 (0;1], ￿ > 1g:
(10)
Consistent with the ￿rst property, the loss function in expressions (9) and (10) applies weights ￿ and ￿,
where 0 ￿ ￿ < ￿, to deviations of individual utility above and below the ES-optimal feasible allocation.
The asymmetric punishment of downward deviations from the ES-optimal feasible allocation implied
by ￿ < ￿ rejects the Utilitarian idea that the distribution of utility across individuals is irrelevant. The
assumption that ￿ ￿ 0 respects Weak Pareto E¢ ciency as discussed above (￿ > 0 would respect Strong
Pareto E¢ ciency). Consistent with the second and third properties, the parameters ￿ > 1 and ￿ 2 (0;1]
imply losses that increase more than proportionally with deviations below and gains that increase (weakly)
less than proportionally for deviations above the ES-optimal feasible allocation.
2.3.3 Planner￿ s problem
With the loss functions de￿ned by expressions (8), (9) and (10), the planner in this case chooses
￿
ci
￿;yi
￿
￿I
i=1
to solve the following problem.
Problem 2 Social Planner￿ s Problem (speci￿c case)
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where
￿Util + ￿ES = 1;
V (￿) is de￿ned in (10), F is de￿ned in (2), and IC is de￿ned in (3):
This planner￿ s problem is equivalent to the conventional approach if ￿ES = 0:
To illustrate the e⁄ect of positive ￿ES on optimal policy, I simulate a simple model with two types of
workers and show how this form of normative diversity a⁄ects the well-being of individuals in the economy.
2.3.4 Example with two types
Individual income-earning ability is either w1 = 10 or w2 = 50, each of which makes up half the population,
so p1 = p2 = 0:5: The individual utility function is
U
￿
ci;yi=wi￿
=
￿
ci￿1￿￿
￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
￿
1
￿
￿
yi
wi
￿￿
;
where ￿ = 1:5; ￿ = 3. The Equal Sacri￿ce loss function￿ s parameters are ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 20; ￿ = 2:0; ￿ = 1:0,
and the social loss function￿ s weight on the Equal Sacri￿ce loss function is ￿ES = 0:20. Government spending
20G is set to zero.
This simple example is most useful for showing the e⁄ect of such a mixed objective on the allocation
of utility across individuals. Figure 4 plots the utility of the high-ability individual against that of the
low-ability individual. The bold solid line shows the utility possibilities frontier (UPF): that is, the highest
incentive-compatible, feasible utility for the low-ability individual given a utility level for the high-ability
individual. The thin solid and dotted lines are the indi⁄erence curves passing through the ￿-optimal feasible
(but not necessarily incentive compatible) allocations for the Utilitarian and Equal Sacri￿ce criteria. The
dashed line is the indi⁄erence curve for the planner that chooses (by tangency with the UPF) the optimal
allocation for the economy. Also shown are the optimal feasible and incentive-compatible allocations chosen
by each criterion.
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Figure 4: The Utility Possibilities Frontier and Indi⁄erence Curves in the Two-Type Example
Figure 4 shows how the Equal Sacri￿ce loss function, LES; di⁄ers from the Utilitarian, LUtil. To remain
indi⁄erent while moving away from its optimal allocation, LES requires a greater gain for the low-ability
individual in exchange for a given loss for the high-ability individual. Moreover, LES increases more than
proportionally with these deviations, while LUtil is linear. The impact of incorporating this loss function in
the planner￿ s decisions is as expected: the planner compromises between the competing normative criteria,
implementing some redistribution but stopping well short of what a Utilitarian would choose. By varying
￿Util, we can shift the planner￿ s chosen allocation along the UPF.
212.4 The set of policy options o⁄ered to survey respondents
The set of policy options presented to respondents in the survey of Section 1 were generated using this
section￿ s generalized optimal tax model. Here, I describe the calibration of the model to data on the U.S.
income distribution and the parameterizations of the model that generate those policies. I also describe the
two additional policies, based on other criteria, that were o⁄ered as options in the survey.
2.4.1 Calibration of the model
For each policy objective, I simulate a constrained planner￿ s problem as in expression (11), calibrated to data
on the U.S. income distribution from 2006, as calculated by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce. In particular, I
take the gross labor income distribution as calculated (by the CBO) into eight bins: the bottom four quintiles
and the next 10, 5, 4, and 1 percentiles. The CBO also provides taxes paid for these households,36 so I use the
utility function speci￿ed below to back out the earnings ability implied by the households￿pre-tax earnings
and tax payments. Then, I calculate the earnings each household would choose if there were no taxation,
again using the individual utility function de￿ned below. This calculation yields the distribution presented
to respondents as the baseline "no tax" income distribution. The distribution of ability for the model, where
wi denotes the ability and pi the population proportion of type i, is as follows.
Ability distribution
wi 3:01 12:65 23:21 37:42 53:05 68:43 95:66 258:64
pi 0:20 0:20 0:20 0:20 0:10 0:05 0:04 0:01
All model parameters other than ￿ES and ￿Util retain the same values across simulations. These para-
meters, and the underlying formal structure of the problem, are never disclosed to respondents. I assume
the following parameter values.
Parameter values
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
￿￿1 ’ G
2:0 1:0 0 10 0:10 2￿￿ 8:26
The utility function for all households is
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￿
ci;yi=wi￿
= ln
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￿
’
￿
￿
yi
wi
￿￿
: (12)
The values of ￿; ￿; ￿;and ￿ determine the shape of the Equal Sacri￿ce loss function. The parameter ￿ controls
the elasticity of labor supply, while ’ is a taste shifter used only to normalize labor e⁄ort. The value of G is
chosen so that government expenditure as a share of equilibrium total output roughly matches that in the
United States. Three parameter values deserve additional comment.
First, assuming ￿ = 0 implies that deviations of individual utility above the ES-optimal feasible allocation
generate no gains according to the Equal Sacri￿ce criterion. This is the strictest version of the Equal
Sacri￿ce loss function, in that it rejects redistribution even if it generates enormous gains for some as long
as it generates any losses for others. To the extent that respondents are, in reality, sympathetic to a more
36The CBO provides income taxes, which are due to both labor and capital income tax payments. For simplicity, I multiply
total personal income taxes paid by the labor share of income for each type of household to generate labor income taxes.
Variations on this approach yield very similar results in terms of the distribution of abilities.
22moderate version of Equal Sacri￿ce, this assumption biases the survey toward support for more Utilitarian
policies.
Second, the implied Frisch labor supply elasticity 1
￿￿1 is low in these parameterizations, at 0.10. That
is below most mainstream estimates, though not for prime-aged heads of households. Lower labor supply
elasticities will reduce the e¢ ciency costs of redistributive policies, increasing their appeal. Therefore, our
survey results are likely to be biased toward Utilitarianism due to this choice.
Third, assuming logarithmic utility of consumption may underestimate the concavity of that subutility
function. If so, this assumption generates policies with less income redistribution than what a more realistic
calibration would produce. As with the other assumptions above, this bias would tend to increase the
reported support for Utilitarianism in the survey, as the survey results show that most people prefer less
redistributive policies than the purely Utilitarian one.
2.4.2 Generating the survey￿ s policy options
Table 3 shows the seven policy options in the survey of Section 1, decreasing in redistributiveness from left
to right. For each option, it shows the average tax rates they levy on each household. In the ￿nal column of
the table, before-tax incomes in the no-tax scenario are shown.
Table 3: Features of the tax systems among which respondents choose
Tax system:
C A E D G B F
HH type No-tax earnings Average tax rates (in percent)
1 $6,205 -895 -731 -504 -345 -260 14 97
2 $24,314 -119 -94 -43 -8 11 14 33
3 $43,961 -14 -9 16 16 16 14 18
4 $70,254 30 28 22 19 17 14 12
5 $99,114 48 44 28 22 19 14 8
6 $127,252 56 51 33 25 21 14 6
7 $177,199 68 60 39 29 23 14 5
8 $476,167 81 79 59 45 35 12 2
Weight on ES: ￿ES
Rawls 0:00 0:0￿ 3 0:10 0:20 1:00 Poll tax
The middle ￿ve policies in Table 3 combine Utilitarianism and Equal Sacri￿ce, using a range of values
for ￿ES in the planner￿ s problem from expression (11). The value ￿ES = 0:00 yields the conventional
Utilitarian policy, while ￿ES = 1:00 yields the Equal Sacri￿ce policy. In between these polar values, three
values generate intermediate policies: ￿ES = f0:0￿ 3; 0:10; 0:20g:
I also generate the two "endpoint" policies shown in Table 3. The left-most policy, C, is a "Rawlsian"
policy that maximizes the utility of the lowest-ability household, i = 1. Formally, the planner solves the
problem
max
fci
￿;yi
￿gI
i=12fF\ICg
U
￿
c1
￿;y1
￿=w1￿
;
where F is de￿ned in (2); IC is de￿ned in (3); and U
￿
c1;y1=w1￿
is de￿ned in (12). The Rawlsian policy is
23the most redistributive policy option. The right-most policy is a "poll tax" that splits the ￿nancial cost of
government spending G evenly across households. Formally, under a poll tax,
ci
￿ = yi
￿ ￿
1
I
G for all i 2 f1;:::;Ig;
and households maximize utility subject to this constraint. The poll tax is the least redistributive policy
option (it is, in fact, regressive).
Adding these endpoint policies yields two bene￿ts. First, o⁄ering the Rawlsian and poll tax options
addresses a potential framing problem with presenting respondents with only the set of policies along the
Utilitarian-Equal Sacri￿ce spectrum. To the extent that individuals shy away from options that seem "ex-
treme," having policies A and B as endpoints could bias us toward ￿nding support for a mixed objective.
Adding the Rawlsian and poll tax options as the endpoints on the redistributive spectrum may alleviate this
concern. Second, the most common deviation from pure Utilitarianism in conventional optimal tax theory
is a generalized Utiltarianism under which the planner takes a concave transformation of utilities before
summing them. The Rawlsian option is often included as a simple way to capture this generalization. By
including a Rawlsian policy as a choice, we can gauge the empirical support for this prominent criterion.
3 Descriptive power of the positive optimal tax model
In this section I show that the optimal tax model, as proposed and empirically estimated in this paper, is
remarkably successful at matching aspects of existing policy that are di¢ cult to reconcile in conventional
theory but widely endorsed in reality. I focus especially on the puzzle of limited tagging. I prove analytically
that the model with an objective for taxation that puts some weight on Equal Sacri￿ce will do less tagging
than the conventional model. I then use numerical simulations to show, quantitatively, that the calibrations
of that model favored in the survey evidence of Section 1 can explain speci￿c patterns of tagging and
redistribution in the United States. I go on to show that optimal policy according to the same calibration
can help resolve two additional puzzling gaps between conventional theory and actual policy.
3.1 Why do we redistribute so much but tag so little?
Tagging has an illustrious theoretical pedigree. James Mirrlees (1971) noted the potential of tagging in only
the ￿fth sentence of his Nobel Prize-winning analysis of optimal taxation. George Akerlof (1978), also a
recipient of the Nobel Prize, worked out the basic theory of tagging in a seminal paper just seven years later.
Forty years into the modern optimal tax literature, recent analyses have shown the substantial potential
gains from tagging according to three speci￿c personal characteristics: height, gender, and race (see Mankiw
and Weinzierl 2010; Alesina, Ichino, and Karabarbounis 2011 and Cremer, Gahvari, and Lozachmeur 2010;
and Blumkin, Margalioth, and Sadka 2009). Though the most general version of the standard optimal tax
model does not necessarily imply tagging, the speci￿cations of that model that dominate research strongly
recommend it.37
37I am grateful to a referee for suggesting this clari￿cation. A fully general model in which the social welfare function simply
uses Pareto weights to value individual utility may not endorse tagging, depending on the values assumed for those Pareto
weights. For example, if "needs" vary with a tag that is positive correlated with ability, optimal policy may avoid using the
tag. Or, if Pareto weights put high value on those with high income-earning ability, optimal policy may not wish to redistribute
toward low-ability individuals, making tags less valuable. Such interpretations of the model are relatively rare, however, and
the claim that tagging is optimal under a Utilitarian criterion is largely uncontroversial. To cite just one example, Piketty
and Saez (2012) write in their new chapter for the Handbook of Public Economics that "We have assumed that T(z) depends
24In the modern theory of optimal taxation, tagging is a free lunch, and a wide variety of candidate tags
exist. Any observable and largely inelastic characteristic across which the distribution of abilities di⁄ers
ought to a⁄ect tax schedules. For example, groups with higher mean ability ought to be taxed to support
other groups, while groups with a higher variance of ability ought to face a more progressive within-group
tax policy. As Mirrlees writes: "One might obtain information about a man￿ s income-earning potential from
his apparent I.Q., the number of his degrees, his address, age or colour..."38 There are many other potential
tags￿ height, gender, facial symmetry, place in birth order, native language, parental traits, macroeconomic
conditions at age 18, and so on￿ all of which relate systematically to income-earning ability and are largely
exogenous to the individual. Genetic information may someday provide particularly powerful tags.39
In comparison, the role for tagging in modern tax policy is highly constrained. Some sizeable tagging
does occur, but only for tags that are virtually guaranteed to indicate that a taxpayer has low income-earning
ability. For example, disability bene￿ts are common among developed countries, as are programs aimed at
alleviating poverty among the elderly. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of U.S. federal entitlement spending goes
to programs generally limited to the elderly and disabled (Viard, 2001). These groups are the prototypical
examples of those with systematically low income-earning ability.40 The other large example of tagging
is payments to families with young children, where the per capita ability to earn income is mechanically
low when compared to childless households. Other, isolated programs such as bene￿ts for the blind follow
a similar pattern, so that existing tagging bears little resemblance to the broad and nuanced application
recommended by modern optimal tax theory.
The generalized model proposed in this paper can resolve this puzzle. The Equal Sacri￿ce principle says
that all taxpayers should bear the same sacri￿ce (in terms of reduced well-being) from paying taxes. Tagging
violates Equal Sacri￿ce because it causes, for example, a tall person to pay more tax￿ and therefore bear
a greater sacri￿ce￿ than a short person who has the same ability to earn income. A revised optimal tax
theory that values Equal Sacri￿ce, as do the preferred policies in the survey of Section 1, will determine
whether to use a given tag by weighing the costs of such violations against the gains it generates according
to Utilitarianism. Only tags providing su¢ ciently strong information about ability, and therefore Utilitarian
welfare gains, will be optimal according to this mixed objective.
3.1.1 Analytical results on optimal tagging
To analyze optimal tagging, I modify the social planner￿ s problem so that individuals di⁄er in two character-
istics: unobservable ability w indexed by i, and an observable, tagged variable indexed by m = f1;2;:::;Mg.
Therefore, allocations are denoted
￿
ci;m;yi;m￿I;M
i=1;m=1 and the population proportion of the individual with
only on earnings z. In reality, the government can observe many other characteristics (denoted by vector X) also correlated
with ability (and hence social welfare weights) such as gender, race, age, disability, family structure, height, etc. Hence, the
government could set T(z,X) and use the characteristic X as a ￿tag￿in the tax system. There are two noteworthy theoretical
results. First, if characteristic X is immutable then there should be full redistribution across groups with di⁄erent X..."
38Despite this quotation, age should not be considered a tag. Unlike these other characteristics, age is shared by all individuals
(abstracting from mortality variation), so that age-dependent taxes do not achieve support for a disadvantaged group by taxing
another. In particular, age-dependent taxes do not violate equal sacri￿ce once the full lifecycle of each taxpayer is considered.
See Weinzierl (2011) for a study of this and other aspects of age-dependent taxes.
39Note that privacy concerns may be relevant for some potential tags, such as genetic information. A concern for privacy is
one example of a value that could be incorporated into the optimal tax model using the approach of this paper, provided that
it can be translated convincingly into a preference over ￿nal allocations.
40The economic prospects for people over the age of 65 have improved in the decades since the programs designed to support
the elderly were created. The current debate over raising the retirement age in these programs may re￿ect, in part, skepticism
that age 65 is still a reliable indicator of lower income-earning ability. Also, see the earlier note in this section on age not being
a proper tag.
25ability i and tagged variable value m is denoted pi;m where
I P
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pi;m = 1. The modi￿ed planner￿ s
problem is as follows.
Problem 3 Social Planner￿ s Problem with Tagging
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where
￿Util + ￿ES = 1;
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the feasibility set is a natural modi￿cation of expression (2);
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and the set of incentive compatible allocations IC is:
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o
:
(16)
In this problem the incentive constraints (16) are m-speci￿c. That is, the planner can restrict each
individual to the allocations within his or her tagged group, whereas if tagging were excluded the planner
would be required to ensure that each individual preferred his or her allocation to that of any individual in
any tagged group.
The following proposition is implied by the ￿rst-order conditions of this planner￿ s problem, assuming
separable utility between consumption and labor e⁄ort. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 If Uc;y=w (c;y=w) = 0, the solution to the Social Planner￿ s Problem with Tagging satis￿es:
Ei
￿￿
Uc
i;m
￿
￿￿1￿
Ei
￿￿
Uc
i;n
￿
￿￿1￿ =
Ei
￿
￿Util ￿ ￿ES
@V(U
i;m
ES ;U
i;m
￿ )
@U
i;m
￿
￿
Ei
￿
￿Util ￿ ￿ES
@V(U
i;n
ES;U
i;n
￿ )
@U
i;n
￿
￿ ; (17)
where U
i;m
￿ denotes U
￿
c
i;m
￿ ;y
i;m
￿ =wi
￿
and Uc
i;m
￿ denotes @U
￿
c
i;m
￿ ;y
i;m
￿ =wi
￿
=@c
i;m
￿ :
The left-hand side of (17) is the ratio of the expected inverse marginal utilities of consumption across
tagged types.41 This equals the ratio of the cost in consumption units of an incentive-compatible marginal
41Note that the terms in brackets on the right-hand side of expression (17) are related to marginal social welfare weights, as
in Saez and Stantcheva (2012). In the conventional model, these terms are equal to one. Here, they di⁄er from one because of
26increase in utility across all individuals with tagged value m versus n. The following corollary makes plain
why this ratio is of interest.
Corollary 1 If ￿ES = 0, equation (17) simpli￿es to:
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￿￿1￿
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i;n
￿
￿￿1￿ = 1: (18)
This result, also shown in Weinzierl (2011) for age-dependent taxes and labeled the Symmetric Inverse
Euler equation in that context, shows that the Utilitarian planner with access to tagging will equalize the
cost of providing utility to tagged groups. Intuitively, the planner has full information about the tag, so
any opportunity to raise overall welfare by transfers across tag values will be exploited.
Next, I derive a condition analogous to (18) for positive ￿ES. I make two mild assumptions to provide a
clean benchmark case.42 Importantly, both of these assumptions hold in the numerical simulations below.
Assumption 1: At least one pair of tagged groups (m;n) 2 f1;2;:::;Mg can be ordered such that m < n
implies that the solution to the Social Planner￿ s Problem with Tagging when ￿ES < 1 satis￿es
Ui;m
￿ ￿ Ui;n
￿ for all i = f1;2;:::;Ig; (19)
and
Uj;m
￿ > Uj;n
￿ for at least one j = f1;2;:::;Ig: (20)
In words, Assumption 1 holds that tagged groups can be "ranked", for instance by some function of the
mean and variance of wages within each group, so that individuals in at least one higher-ranked group fare
no better, and in some cases worse, than individuals of the same abilities in a lower-ranked group when
the planner is at least in part Utilitarian. That is, individuals of any given ability obtain allocations that
generate greater losses or smaller gains when they are members of a higher-ranked group.
Assumption 1 is closely related to a well-known result from previous optimal tax analyses that an "advan-
taged" tagged group is taxed heavily by a conventional Utilitarian-optimal tax policy. Mankiw and Weinzierl
(2010) show this numerically for the optimal height tax in the United States, under which a tall taxpayer
ends up with lower utility than a short taxpayer of the same ability. Intuitively, the planner treats those with
the advantaged tag as higher-skilled workers on average, requiring them to produce more income than others.
Mirrlees (1971, 1974) showed much the same result for higher ability individuals in the full information case
(which is the relevant analogue) of his optimal tax problem, a result discussed in a di⁄erent context (rank
reversals) below.
Assumption 2: In the solution to the Social Planner￿ s Problem with Tagging when ￿ES < 1,
U
i;m
ES 6= Ui;m
￿ for all i = f1;2;:::;Ig and m 2 f1;2;:::;Mg: (21)
Assumption 2 is a technical assumption that rules out the scenario in which the utility allocated to
any individual under the optimal policy exactly equals the utility that individual obtains under the ES-
the planner￿ s aversion to unequal sacri￿ce. I am grateful to Bernard Salanie for suggesting this note.
42These assumptions are su¢ cient, but not necessary, for the result in Corollary 2.
27optimal feasible allocation.43 This assumption is unlikely to bind because the optimal allocations with
￿ES < 1 re￿ ect not only the Equal Sacri￿ce priorities but also the Utilitarian ones, and because incentive
compatibility is imposed on the optimal allocations but not on the ES-optimal feasible allocations. Again,
note that Assumption 2 is satis￿ed in all cases in the numerical simulations below.
With these assumptions, the following corollary to Proposition 1 can be derived and compared with
Corollary 1 above. The proof is in the Appendix.
Corollary 2 If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then the solution to Social Planner￿ s Problem with Tagging
satis￿es, for some pair of tagged groups (m;n) 2 f1;2;:::;Mg such that m < n;
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￿￿1￿ < 1: (22)
Corollary 2 states that the planner who puts positive weight on Equal Sacri￿ce allocates consumption
in a way that leaves the cost of raising utility for the disadvantaged group (i.e., m in this example) lower
than that for the advantaged group. As shown in result (18), a purely Utilitarian planner would transfer
additional resources to the disadvantaged group, but the planner with this more diverse objective stops short,
redistributing less. The numerical simulations below reinforce this lesson.44
Intuitively, taxing the advantaged tagged group to aid the disadvantaged group generates costs in unequal
sacri￿ce to this planner. A Utilitarian planner ignores the distribution of sacri￿ce, caring only about total
sacri￿ce (which tagging helps to minimize). This disparity in the treatment of transfers across tagged groups
causes an optimal policy based in part on Equal Sacri￿ce to use tagging less than in conventional theory.
3.1.2 Numerical results on optimal tagging
Next, I use numerical simulations calibrated to micro-level data for the United States to show that the positive
optimal tax model developed and estimated in this paper can quantitatively explain the puzzle of tagging.
First, I consider three prominent potential tags￿ height, gender, and race￿ and show that the parameterizations
of the model preferred in the survey of Section 1 yield an optimal policy that rejects the use of these tags
but accepts redistributive income taxes driven by di⁄erences in income-earning ability. Second, I show that
the most preferred parameterization yields a policy that endorses a sizeable and empirically reasonable tag
on blindness, one of the few personal characteristics explicitly tagged in the U.S. tax code.45
I use the following parameter values in the planning problem of expression (13):
Parameter values
￿ES ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
￿￿1 G
f0:00; 0:0￿ 3; 0:10; 0:20; 1:00g 2:0 1:0 0:01 10 1:5 0:5 20
A few of these values di⁄er from those used to generate the policy options for the survey. While I chose
values for the survey of ￿; ￿, and ￿ to increase the appeal of the conventional Utilitarian policy, here I choose
43In particular, the scenario it rules out, where these utility levels coincide, generates complications due to the nondi⁄er-
entiability of the Equal Sacri￿ce loss function at the point. An alternative assumption to Assumption 2 that yields the same
technical simpli￿cation is that ￿ = 0.
44Corollaries 1 and 2 hold in the simulations of Section 6.
45For simplicity, I do not consider di⁄erences in preferences or elasticities across these groups, though such di⁄erences provide
an alternative justi￿cation for tagging.
28values to maximize realism. I set ￿ > 0 (rather than ￿ = 0) to capture a less strict version of Equal Sacri￿ce,
in particular one that satis￿es the Strong Pareto E¢ ciency property de￿ned in Section 2.46 I set ￿ > 1
(rather than ￿ = 1) to re￿ ect many estimates of the concavity of the utility from consumption that suggest
logarithmic utility is too conservative. I set ￿ = 3 (rather than ￿ = 11) to be closer to mainstream estimates
of the labor supply elasticity for a broad population. I set G to approximate the current value of government
expenditure as a share of total income in the United States.
Rejecting tagging on height, gender, and race but retaining redistribution
The ￿rst data I use allows me to simulate optimal height, gender, and race taxes. To obtain ability
distributions by tagged type, I classify respondents to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth into three
height categories, two gender categories, and two race categories.47 For height, I use gender-dependent
ranges, as the height distributions of males and females are substantially di⁄erent: for men the thresholds
are 70 and 72 inches; for women the thresholds are 63 and 66 inches. Table 4 lists the twelve tagged groups
that these divisions generate in descending order of their mean wage, where the wage is reported earnings
divided by reported hours in 1996.48 The table shows the mean and standard deviation of each group￿ s
reported wages and the population proportion of each group, all adjusted for the NLSY sample weights, as
well as each group￿ s raw sample size in the NLSY.
Table 4: Tagged groups
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Tall Med. Short Tall Tall Short Med. Med. Short Tall Med. Short
M M M M F M M F F F F F
White White White NW White NW NW White White NW NW NW
Mean wage 17.7 16.9 16.3 15.3 14.3 13.6 13.5 12.8 12.3 11.2 10.7 10.5
SD wage 11.3 11.0 10.4 12.3 11.6 9.9 10.4 11.6 10.3 5.9 6.2 5.7
Pop. share 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.05
Obs. 411 507 785 226 340 994 314 557 405 223 469 653
The di⁄erences in wages among these twelve tagged groups are substantial. The highest-earning group in
Table 4 earns a mean wage nearly 70 percent greater than the lowest-earning group. Overall, average wages
are higher for those who are tall, male, and white. Appendix Table 1 provides more detail than Table 4,
reporting the (sample weights-adjusted) distributions of the members of the tagged groups across ten wage
bins. These wage distributions are the second key input to the numerical simulations (in addition to the
assumed parameters described above).
For each of the ￿ve values of ￿ES, I report measures of the optimal extent of tagging and income tax
progressivity in Table 5 and Table 6. To measure the extent of tagging, Table 5 reports the "extra" average
tax paid by or transfer made to the members of each tagged group as a share of their income when the
planner can use tagging as compared to when it cannot. This is the ratio of total tax payments to total
income for each group under the optimal policy less the same ratio under the constrained-optimal policy
46Simulations with the special case of ￿ = 0 show that the results are virtually identical to those reported in the paper.
47I omit individuals who report negative wages or earnings or who report less than 1,000 or more than 4,000 hours of annual
work. The results are not sensitive to these restrictions, which are likely to remove misreported data.
48Using all three tags in concert maximizes the power of tagging in the conventional model.
29with no tagging. If that di⁄erence is positive, the group is paying taxes in addition to what it would pay
without tagging. If that di⁄erence is negative, it is receiving an extra transfer.
Table 5: Extent of Tagging (Extra tax or transfer rate, in percent)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Tall Med. Short Tall Tall Short Med. Med. Short Tall Med. Short
M M M M F M M F F F F F
￿ES White White White NW White NW NW White White NW NW NW
0 10.5 8.1 6.3 1.6 -4.3 -5.5 -3.5 -11.7 -13.4 -17.7 -22.0 -23.4
0:0￿ 3 4.5 3.6 3.1 1.5 -1.1 -1.5 -1.6 -5.0 -6.5 -8.4 -11.8 -12.7
0:10 1.8 1.3 1.3 0.9 -0.4 -0.5 -1.3 -2.0 -2.6 -2.8 -4.9 -5.2
0:20 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.7 -0.1 -0.1 -1.0 -0.9 -1.2 -0.8 -2.0 -2.7
1:00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
To gauge the progressivity of the optimal income tax, Table 6 reports the average tax rate paid by the
members of each wage range under each parameterization.
Table 6: Extent of Progressivity (Average tax rates, in percent)
Average wage rate in range
￿ES 2.81 6.50 10.03 13.82 17.80 21.70 27.28 43.25 62.06 95.96
0 -396 -64 -5 17 27 32 38 50 52 53
0:0￿ 3 -346 -51 1 18 25 30 35 47 50 52
0:10 -300 -39 3 18 23 27 31 43 47 50
0:20 -258 -29 7 17 22 24 28 40 44 47
1:00 -5 11 13 14 16 17 19 22 25 29
Finally, Table 7 shows the welfare gain obtainable from tagging in each case. To compute this welfare
gain, I calculate the increase in consumption for all individuals that would lower the total social loss under
the policy without tagging to the level of total social loss obtained by the optimal policy.
Table 7: Welfare Gain from Tagging
￿ES Percent of aggregate consumption
0 0.96
0:0￿ 3 0.45
0:10 0.20
0:20 0.10
1:00 0.00
The results in these three tables show that the support expressed in the survey of Section 1 for objectives
that include Equal Sacri￿ce can explain the coexistence of limited tagging and substantial income redistrib-
ution through progressive taxes observed in policy. Table 5 shows that Equal Sacri￿ce dramatically reduces
the appeal of tagging according to height, gender, and race, despite the substantial information that these
30three tags carry about income-earning ability. While large group-speci￿c taxes and transfers are optimal
when ￿ES = 0 and none are optimal once ￿ES = 1, the values for ￿ES behind the most favored policies
in this paper￿ s survey (namely, ￿ES = 0:10 and ￿ES = 0:20) generate a steep decline in the use of tags.
At the same time, for these values of ￿ES, Table 6 shows that in all cases the extent of redistribution and
progressivity remains quite high when measured by either the maximal average tax rate or the gap between
the maximal and minimal average tax rates. Table 7 shows that the welfare gains one might achieve through
tagging are estimated to be large in the conventional case of ￿ES = 0 but are small in the cases preferred in
the survey of Section 1.
As a speci￿c example, consider the single most popular policy in the survey of Section 1, in which
￿ES = 0:20. The optimal tag-based tax is 0.8 percent of the highest-earning group￿ s total income in this
parameterization, whereas the conventional model suggests a tax of 10.5 percent. Consistent with this
reduced role for tagging, the welfare gain from tagging in this parameterization is negligible: translated into
the magnitudes of the current U.S. economy, it is equivalent to approximately $15 billion. Assuming some
costs from false tagging and administration (Akerlof 1978), these tags would likely be welfare-reducing, on
net, in this parameterization. In contrast, the conventional model implies a gain worth nearly $150 billion.
Nevertheless, in this parameterization top earners pay an average tax rate of 47 percent, close to the 53
percent recommended by the conventional model, and a substantial transfer is made to the poor. Moreover,
this most-preferred policy recommends a schedule of average tax rates that is quite similar to actual U.S.
policy. To see this resemblence, consider Table 8, which gives the schedule of average tax rates for this
favored parameterization (policy G) and the schedule implied by the same CBO data used to calibrate the
model.49 The close match between these schedules provides further evidence for the power and relevance of
this paper￿ s calibrated positive optimal tax model.
Table 8: Comparing most-preferred policy to actual U.S. average tax rates
Average tax rate in income percentile range (in percent)
Status 1st quintile 20-39 40-59 60-79 80-89 90-94 95-98 99
Most-preferred policy (￿ES = 0:20) -260 11 16 17 19 21 23 35
Actual U.S. tax schedule (CBO) -298 -22 10 21 26 28 31 35
The intuition for these results is as follows. The principle of Equal Sacri￿ce is consistent with the
use of progressive taxes to pay for public goods if a given rate of taxation causes a smaller utility loss
for a higher-income individual than a lower-income one.50 But, that principle places little to no value on
redistribution.51 Similarly, while both Utilitarianism and Equal Sacri￿ce value the e¢ ciency gains from
tagging, tagging violates Equal Sacri￿ce because such personal characteristics have no bearing on individual
utility. Altogether, the introduction of Equal Sacri￿ce considerations into the evaluation of outcomes causes
optimal policy to move away from redistribution and, especially, tagging. For the range of parameters
49Individual income taxes include taxes on capital income, while the simulations are based on labor income only (to match
the model). To calculate tax liability, I multiply each household type￿ s labor share of total market income by its total federal
taxes and use the product as the measure of total taxes paid. While variations on this approach a⁄ect the estimated rates for
top earners, the bottom four quintile￿ s average tax rates are robust to using reasonable alterantive approaches.
50As noted by Berliant and Gouveia (1993), among others, Equal Sacri￿ce endorses progressivity if, in the notation of this
paper, utility is separable across consumption and leisure and ￿ > 1.
51Note that the average tax rate on the lowest earner when ￿ES = 1:0 is slightly negative in this ￿gure. If ￿ = 0, the
otherwise same simulation sets that average tax rate to a positive value. To see why, note that ￿ = 0 represents the most severe
adherence to Equal Sacri￿ce, which rejects redistribution. I use ￿ = 0:01 in the baseline simulation to avoid the concern that
￿ = 0 is a special case, and ￿ > 0 causes the purely Equal Sacri￿ce policy to admit some, although quite limited, redistribution
despite the inequality of sacri￿ce it entails.
31considered here, those e⁄ects are enough to make the optimal extent of tagging on height, gender, and race
negligible but leave substantial redistribution and progressivity intact.
As this intuitive explanation suggests, the key forces determining the optimal extent of tagging in this
model will apply to di⁄erent degrees for di⁄erent tags. Most important, the costs that tagging generates
from the perspective of the Equal Sacri￿ce principle will be smaller when a tag is closely correlated with
ability. If a tag were a perfect indicator of ability, it would generate no costs according to Equal Sacri￿ce.
Given that such a tag would continue to generate e¢ ciency gains by being inelastic to taxation, it would
be more valuable to the social planner. In other words, the model suggests that personal characteristics
are more likely to be used as tags when they provide stronger and more reliable signals of income-earning
ability.52 I now turn to demonstrating this e⁄ect for blindness.
Tagging blindness To demonstrate the model￿ s potential not only to reject most tags but to accept those
few tags that predict ability su¢ ciently well, I consider blindness, one of the few characteristics used as a
tag in existing (i.e., U.S.) tax policy.53 Since 1943, the U.S. tax code has included a special deduction or
exemption for individuals with substantially impaired vision. To claim the exemption, individuals simply
check a box on their tax forms.
The data source used for the previous tagging analysis has too few observations on the blind, so I combine
three years (1985, 1986, and 1987) of the Statistics of Income (SOI) microdata from the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service to obtain an earnings distribution of those who claim the blindness exemption. Lacking any
information on hours worked, I assume all individuals work the same number of hours (2,000 per year) and
calculate hourly wages using individuals￿reported wage and salary incomes. I limit the sample to individuals
￿ling as singles, to avoid complications with the proper treatment of couples that are abstracted from in
the model above. The distributions of calculated wages, adjusted for sampling weights provided in the SOI,
are shown in Table 9. The share of the population in each category also can be estimated from the SOI
sample, adjusting for sampling weights. Those claiming the blindness exemption make up 0.3 percent of the
population, with 99.7 percent not claiming the exemption.
Table 9: Wage distributions for blind and non-blind
Average wage rate in range
Status 0.00 1.73 4.44 7.12 9.60 12.61 15.08 19.17 27.56 44.51 264.19
Blind 0.79 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.000
Not blind 0.17 0.31 0.17 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.030 0.010 0.002 0.001
As Table 9 makes clear, a large majority of those claiming the blindness exemption earned no wage and
salary income and are therefore assigned a zero wage by this calculation. Of course, these individuals would
be likely to earn positive wages in the labor market, but we cannot observe those wages, and a zero wage
may serve as a rough proxy for a combination of high ￿xed costs of work and low true wages. Moreover, I
will assign all of those who do not claim the blindness exemption but earn zero income a zero wage as well,
52The conventional, Utilitarian model also recommends more fully utilizing tags that more accurately signal ability, whether
because of ￿xed costs of tagging or because concavity of individual utility means that tagging errors have some cost. As the
simulation results show, however, a plausible calibration of the conventional model recommends dramatically di⁄erent levels of
tagging than that seen in U.S. policy. Explaining these levels as optimal in a conventional model is likely to be di¢ cult.
53To the extent that disability status implies zero earning ability, it by de￿nition merits tagging. Future work could usefully
focus on showing whether the model can explain the substantial tagging on dependent children in existing policy. That task
will require making judgments on the proper modeling and normative treatment of households.
32so both groups are treated the same.54
Table 10 shows the optimal extent of tagging in the conventional calibration with ￿ES = 0 and in the
most-favored calibration in the survey of Section 1, with ￿ES = 0:20. All other parameters are as before
(though G is adjusted to be a similar share of total income).
Table 10: Extent of Tagging on Blindness
(Extra tax or transfer rate, in percent)
￿ES Not blind Blind
0 0.07 -102.11
0:20 0.01 -19.82
As with height, gender, and race, Table 10 shows that adding this weight on Equal Sacri￿ce to the objective
function substantially reduces the optimal extent of tagging on blindness. Unlike those other tags, however,
the optimal extent of tagging on blindness in the Utilitarian benchmark is so great that even the dramatically
reduced extent of optimal tagging is sizeable￿ namely, a 20 percent transfer to the blind on average. Using
the data from Table 9, we can calculate mean income for the blind (including those with zero income) to
be approximately $2,350 per year. A 20 percent transfer to the blind on average is therefore equivalent to
approximately $470, not far from the value of actual blindness deductions and exemptions in the mid-1980s.
3.1.3 Direct evidence that those who oppose tagging support Equal Sacri￿ce
Here, I present survey results showing that individuals who oppose tagging disproportionately support Equal
Sacri￿ce, augmenting the indirect evidence for this relationship presented above.
In the survey, the respondents see the following text (see the Appendix for the full survey screens):
Suppose that reliable studies show the following fact: on average, short men earn lower
incomes than tall men in the United States. Of course, many short men earn high incomes,
and many tall men earn low incomes. But, these studies show that the average income among
short men is lower than the average income among tall men. The reasons for this di⁄erence are
uncertain.
Now, please consider the following proposal: decrease taxes slightly on short men and increase
taxes slightly on tall men. Because short men, on average, earn less than tall men, this proposal
would, on average, decrease taxes on lower-income men and increase taxes on higher-income men.
A similar question is asked with regard to blindness, for which the respondents are told that the income
di⁄erence between groups is substantially larger than height. Respondents are asked to say whether they
(strongly or somewhat) support or oppose these proposals.
In their responses to this question, those who support a height tag are almost evenly split between the
Utilitarian policy A and the Equal Sacri￿ce policy B, while nearly two-thirds of those who oppose the height
tax prefer the Equal Sacri￿ce policy to the Utilitarian policy. The gaps are yet wider for the proposed
blindness tag.55 These patterns provide direct support to the mechanism proposed in this paper, namely
that a concern for Equal Sacri￿ce limits popular support for tagging.
54I excluded those who earn no income from the main analysis of tagging because they are so rare in the NLSY data. However,
simulations including these individuals leave the results on height, gender, and race taxation unchanged.
55One can look at these data in the "other direction," as well. Namely, 75 percent of those who choose policy A oppose
a height tag, compared to 82 percent of those who choose policy B. Only about half of those who choose policy A oppose a
blindness tag, compared to more than two-thirds of those who choose policy B.
333.1.4 Relationship between this analysis and the principle of horizontal equity
The way in which this paper￿ s positive optimal tax model resolves the puzzle of tagging reveals that it
provides a normatively rigorous foundation for the concern over horizontal equity long intuited as the obstacle
to greater tagging.
Concerns over horizontal equity and the other main reasons why tagging may be unappealing in practice
have been discussed from the beginning.56 Akerlof (1978) himself writes: "the disadvantages of tagging...
are the perverse incentives to people to be identi￿ed as needy (to be tagged), the inequity of such a system,
and its cost of administration." Akerlof￿ s ￿rst and third disadvantages of tagging are straightforward but of
limited e⁄ect.57 In contrast, the concern over horizontal equity￿ the notoriously di¢ cult-to-de￿ne principle
that "equals ought to be treated equally"￿ has been prominent. Boadway and Pestieau (2006) write: "Of
course, such a system may be resisted because, if the tagging characteristic has no direct utility consequences,
a di⁄erentiated tax system violates the principle of horizontal equity". Similar statements are made by, e.g.,
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Auerbach and Hassett (1999).
As has been widely recognized, the intuitive appeal of horizontal equity is not supported by a solid
normative foundation, at least in the context of the optimal tax problem. As Kaplow (2008) writes, the
principle of horizontal equity "lacks a¢ rmative justi￿cation." The core of the problem for horizontal equity is
that its intuitive appeal is based on its guarantee of equal treatment, but in fact it provides only a limited and
arbitrary form of equal treatment, namely across those characteristics deemed "horizontal." The principle
o⁄ers no reliable guidance as to how that classi￿cation ought to be made. Musgrave (1959) puts it best:
"If there is no speci￿ed reason for discriminating among unequals, how can there be a reason for avoiding
discrimination among equals?"
Note that the ￿ aws in horizontal equity as it applies to optimal taxation may not matter in other contexts,
such as in the use of statistical discrimination or in determining legal liability. If we are not intending to
treat individuals di⁄erentially across an exogenous dimension of heterogeneity, then horizontal equity may be
thought of as equivalent to equal treatment more generically. The Utilitarian optimal tax policy, however,
treats individuals of di⁄erent abilities di⁄erently, making horizontal equity￿ s incomplete version of equal
treatment apparent.58
In contrast, the principle of Equal Sacri￿ce is a comprehensive criterion of optimal taxation with a solid
normative foundation of equal treatment for all individuals that, as one of its outcomes, discourages tagging.
In other words, rather than a requirement of horizontal equity acting as an ad hoc explanation for limited
tagging, in this paper a concern for horizontal equity arises endogenously out of the classic principle of Equal
Sacri￿ce.59
56Additional concerns about tagging exist. First, tagging could induce stigma. Stigma in this context is plausibly related to
the normative appeal of equal sacri￿ce, as those receiving tag-based transfers would be sacri￿cing less. Second, tagging could
slow the resolution of underlying distortions. If those distortions are due to irrational behavior by employers, it is unclear why
tagging would exacerbate their mistakes. If not, the distortions are likely to be persistent. Third, tagging may be against the
laws or constitutions of various nations. Any such prohibitions on tagging beg the question of why they are accepted by voters.
57Tags are undoubtedly less appealing if they are easily mimicked￿ as they would then distort behavior while failing to
redistribute￿ or costly to monitor and administer. Most of the candidate tags mentioned above and considered in modern tax
theory, however, are inelastic and cheap to enforce. Even a statistic such as "apparent I.Q.", which may seem both elastic and
costly to monitor, has such large implications outside the tax system for individuals that we might argue it would be largely
immune to these concerns. Mirrlees (1971) makes the same point on I.Q. See page 208. Certainly a characteristic such as gender
is highly inelastic and could be cheaply incorporated into the tax system.
58I am grateful to Yoram Margalioth and to a referee for comments that prompted this discussion. An early analysis by Balcer
and Sadka (1982) examined the conditions under which a Utilitarian tax policy would violate or respect horizontal equity.
59This appealing property of Equal Sacri￿ce is related to what Berliant and Gouveia (1993) label "an ethically undesirable
property of the solutions implied by the [conventional] optimal income tax formulations: the marginal tax faced by a taxpayer
depends, other things equal, on the density of the population on the domain of taxpayer characteristics."
34Finally, while the distinction between Equal Sacri￿ce and horizontal equity may seem subtle, the paper
presents substantial evidence on prevailing normative preferences that cannot be explained as a concern for
horizontal equity. The survey evidence of Section 1 shows implicit support for Equal Sacri￿ce (or a similar
criterion) through respondents￿choices over income tax policies for which horizontal equity is irrelevant.
That survey also showed that most individuals directly support, when asked, a more equal distribution
of sacri￿ce than the Utilitarian criterion would recommend, even if it were augmented with a concern for
horizontal equity. Moreover, neither of the additional puzzles addressed in Section 3.2 below can be addressed
by horizontal equity. Together with the puzzle of tagging, these additional ￿ndings suggest that a criterion
broader than horizontal equity, but one that also yields a similar intuition as does horizontal equity in the
context of tagging, is a required component of a viable positive optimal tax model.
3.2 Using the generalized model to address two additional puzzles
Next, I show that the same favored calibration of this paper￿ s positive optimal tax model can help address
two additional puzzles in optimal tax research.
3.2.1 Rank reversals
It has been known since the analyses in Mirrlees (1971) and Mirrlees (1974) that an optimal Utilitarian tax
policy in the case of full information generally induces a negative relationship between innate ability and the
allocation of utility across individuals. This reversal of pre-tax and post-tax utility orderings has generated
considerable discomfort among, especially, tax law scholars (see, for example, Zelenak, 2006).
In this section, I use a detailed calibration of the U.S. ability distribution60 to simulate ￿rst-best (i.e.,
full information) feasible income tax policies for a range of model parameterizations. Figure 5 shows the
results by plotting utility as a function of ability in four scenarios.
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Figure 5: Utility levels by ability type under di⁄erent objective
functions in full-information ￿rst-best allocations.
60The previous section￿ s simulation used a calibration of the U.S. ability (i.e., wage) distribution that was limited by the
availability of tagging data. Here, I use a lognormal-Pareto calibration of the U.S. wage distribution originally calculated by
Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009).
35The thick solid line is the hypothetical laissez-faire allocation in which no taxes are collected. It shows
how utility increases monotonically with ability absent government intervention. The other three lines show
utilities under three parameterizations: the thin solid line is for the Utilitarian case of ￿ES = 0:00, the
dotted line is for the Equal Sacri￿ce case of ￿ES = 1:00, and the dashed line is for the mixed case preferred
in the survey of Section 1 in which ￿ES = 0:20. All other parameters are as in the tagging simulations above
(though G is adjusted to be a similar share of total income).
Figure 5 shows the rank reversals when going from the laissez-faire or Equal Sacri￿ce allocations to the
Utilitarian allocation, as the upward sloping thick solid and dotted lines contrast sharply with the downward
sloping thin solid line. The empirically-preferred, mixed objective (shown as the dashed line) generates a
far more uniform utility distribution than either of the more pure objective functions. More important, the
empirically-preferred objective chooses a ￿rst-best allocation that substantially limits rank reversals. The
reason for this result is that Equal Sacri￿ce￿ s optimal allocation reduces each individual￿ s utility by the same
quantity and thus leaves the utility ordering of agents unchanged. In the mixed objective functions used
here, the Utilitarian preference for rank reversals is tempered.
3.2.2 Optimal top marginal income tax rates
Finally, I use the more detailed ability distribution from the previous simulation to explore in depth the e⁄ects
of a role for Equal Sacri￿ce on optimal marginal income tax rates. I use the same preferred calibration
(￿ES = 0:20) in which the optimal policy rejected height, gender, and race tags, accepted tagging on
blindness and substantial redistribution, and largely avoided rank reversals in utility in the ￿rst-best. All
other parameters are as before.61
Figure 6 shows the optimal schedule of marginal tax rates for this calibration, calculated as the distortions
to individuals consumption-leisure margins (as de￿ned formally in the Appendix). For comparison, the ￿gure
also shows the optimal results under a pure Utilitarian criterion, that is when ￿ES = 0 as in the conventional
model.
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Figure 6: Optimal Marginal Tax Rates
Figure 6 shows that the optimal marginal income tax rate at high incomes falls substantially, by about
seven percentage points, with the empirically-preferred role for the principle of Equal Sacri￿ce. The marginal
61The appendix contains analytical results on optimal marginal rates in this model.
36tax rate schedule has the U-shape introduced by Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001) whether ￿ES = 0 or 0:20,
though positive ￿ES does lead to lower rates for all workers. The explanation for this pattern is that the
planner with ￿ES > 0 redistributes less. This reduces higher earners￿temptation to mimic lower income
earners and thus the required distortions throughout the income distribution. At the same time, substantial
redistribution persists despite this role for the principle of Equal Sacri￿ce. Though not shown here, the
high-skilled continue to pay sizeable average tax rates of 45 percent, not far from the 54 percent rate under
the Utilitarian policy. A related result is that the lowest-ability type enjoys a level of consumption worth 52
percent of average consumption in the economy under the policy with ￿ES = 0:20 compared to 63 percent
under the Utilitarian policy with ￿ES = 0.
Therefore, this paper￿ s calibrated positive optimal tax model may help address a gap between conventional
theory and existing policy noted by Diamond and Saez (2011). Using the conventional model, they conclude
that the optimal top rate is "73 percent, substantially higher than the current 42.5 percent top US marginal
tax rate (combining all taxes)." The top rate in the mixed policy shown in Figure 6 is 55 percent, compared to
62 percent under the conventional Utilitarian criterion. Of course, a number of other potential explanations
exist for why top marginal tax rates are not higher, such as a higher elasticity of taxable incomes at high
income levels or the existence of preference heterogeneity. But these simulation results suggest that a
di⁄erence between the objective assumed in the conventional model and the prevailing normative preferences
in society may play a role.
4 Conclusion
The optimal tax literature occupies a rare place in economic research in which the normative assumptions
of economists are given priority. The conventional use of Utilitarianism as the criterion for optimal policy
is expedient, as it narrows the range of models to consider. It may also be compelling, if we believe the
Utilitarian criterion is the right one.
An alternative to the conventional model￿ s approach is to use empirical evidence on normative preferences
to develop a positive optimal tax theory in which economists￿normative intuitions are replaced by those that
hold sway among voters and taxpayers in reality. Of course, a number of classic questions arise about such
an approach, such as: whose preferences matter for policymaking, how are individual preferences aggregated,
and what are the admissable normative criteria. This paper has not focused on these questions, which are
important topics for future work. The conventional approach sidesteps these questions, but at the potential
cost of relevance.
In this paper, I make three contributions toward demonstrating the promise of such a positive optimal
tax theory.
First, I present novel survey evidence on the empirical normative preferences of individuals in the United
States. Using a fully-speci￿ed planner￿ s problem, I generate feasible and incentive-compatible tax policies
that are optimal according to a range of social objective functions, and I have respondents rank these policies.
I ￿nd striking and robust results: few respondents prefer the conventional Utilitarian policy or the Rawlsian
alternative, and a plurality (nearly half) prefer policies that re￿ ect a mixed objective that gives weight to
both Utilitarianism and Equal Sacri￿ce. This evidence is consistent with a substantial body of previous work
showing that the normative reasoning of most individuals draws on a diverse set of criteria.
Second, I generalize the conventional optimal tax model to accommodate this evidence of a mixed objec-
tive for taxation. This generalization requires overcoming the challenge of combining disparate, sometimes
37incommensurable, criteria for optimality. I develop a method by which any set of criteria can be integrated
into a uni￿ed objective that respects Pareto e¢ ciency, and I apply that method to the speci￿c case of two
criteria at the heart of this paper: Utilitarianism and Equal Sacri￿ce. More generally, this method provides a
way to inform the choice of welfare weights in the generalized Pareto-e¢ cient approach to optimal taxation.
Third, I show that the empirically-preferred calibration of the generalized theory has remarkable ex-
planatory power as a positive optimal tax model. I focus on the model￿ s ability to explain the limited role
of tagging in policy that is otherwise quite redistributive. I show, analytically, that a concern for Equal
Sacri￿ce limits the optimal extent of tagging. I then simulate optimal policy with the objective functions
favored by survey respondents, calibrated to microdata from the United States. That policy rejects the use
of height, gender, and race as tags; it accepts the use of blindness as a tag, endorsing a quantitatively realistic
blindness bene￿t; and it provides redistribution through a progressive schedule of average income tax rates
that closely resembles actual policy. Moreover, it substantially reduces the extent of utility rank reversals
in the ￿rst-best policy, and it implies top marginal tax rates lower than what conventional theory would
recommend and closer to reality. In sum, optimal policy in this calibrated model matches remarkably well
several prominent characteristics of existing policy that are puzzling from the perspective of conventional
theory but widely endorsed in reality.
The traditional goal of optimal tax research has been to choose the "right" normative objective for policy
and characterize the tax system that best attains it. Public opinion on the appropriate normative criterion
has been seen as beside the point. An alternative goal, pursued in this paper, is to characterize the tax
system that best attains the normative objective that prevails in reality. Recognizing that moral authority
in reality rests not with tax theorists but with voters and policymakers, this paper heeds the advice of
Samuelson (1980) that "Basic questions concerning right and wrong goals to be pursued cannot be settled
by mere science as such....The citizenry must ultimately decide such issues."
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